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I. INTRODUCTION

The post-September 11 era is a propitious, if deeply unfortunate, one in
which to reexamine the landscape of the First Amendment's protection of free
speech. That this might be so was surely evident even before the smoke had
cleared on that awful day. I do not believe I was the only person who wondered
in the wake of those events what would become of civil liberty in what seemed to
be a new wartime environment. Free speech, often thought of as the first
freedom, seemed likely to be among the first to suffer.'
It is all the more important to turn one's thoughts to our settled ways of
thinking about the First Amendment now because that fear turns out to have
been almost entirely misplaced. 2 Although the United States has enacted antiterrorist legislation that is sweeping in scope and raises significant constitutional
concerns about a host of criminal protections and about associative freedom, in
the United States, at least, the freedom of speech has gone largely untouched by

1. See, e.g., Susan Gellman, The First
Amendment in a Time That Tries Men's Souls, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 87 (2002) ("In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, not
only legal scholars, but all Americans, wondered what the civil liberties fallout would be. A particular
area of concern was, and still is, the First Amendment protections, especially of speech and press.").
2. Gellman, supra note 1, continues,
And then a surprising thing happened: Nothing. Well, not nothing, but significantly less, in
the way of government infringement upon civil liberties, than many of us had feared in the
dangerous early period.... [A]t least of this writing, it truly cannot be said that government
in the United States has responded to the current crisis by grossly restricting our First
Amendment rights of speech, press, or religion.
Id. at 87-88.
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recent events.
This outcome was hardly compelled by lack of public support for speechrestrictive measures. As one poll taken in the fall of 2001 noted, a slim majority
of the American public at the time favored government censorship of news it
believes is a threat to national security. 4 Nor, however tempting it may be to
think so (a product of the very phenomena I discuss below), was there anything
unique about the circumstances of September 11 that might have dissuaded
legislators from enacting, or law enforcement officials from enforcing, the kind
of speech-restrictive measures that have been a common feature in other periods
of hot and cold war. To be sure, the September 11 attacks involved acts taken by
foreigners on domestic soil as a result of persuasive speech that was delivered
abroad, and the attacks evoked little sympathy on these shores. But although
Congress, in responding to the September 11 attacks, cast a broad net over
radical (and even moderate) Muslims who might have been dimly connected to
foreign terrorist networks, it could have gone still further. It could also have
reasoned that speech that was even slightly sympathetic to the aims of foreign
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or Hamas posed a risk of further terrorist

3. See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September
11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 443-56 (2002) (listing potential civil liberties concerns raised by
government response to September 11 without listing First Amendment curtailment, although noting
that law enforcement officials may engage in increased numbers of investigations based on speech and
associational ties of targets of investigation); Matin R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech
Rationales After September llth: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 185, 186, 200 (2002) (cataloging some instances of private criticisms of certain
speakers in the wake of September 11, while acknowledging that "[t]he First Amendment... is not
concerned, as a conceptual matter, with situations where private actors take or threaten action that
might chill or limit speech"). The only government incursion on speech identified by these authors is
the enactment of legislation providing that aliens who donate to groups certified as terrorist
organizations are subject to deportment-a potential First Amendment violation, but far from the
same character as the historical examples discussed in this Article. See id. at 187.
In May 2002, the Attorney General proposed expanding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
powers to permit agents to monitor Internet sites, political and religious groups, and libraries. See Neil
A. Lewis, Ashcroft Permits F.B.I. to Monitor Internet and Public Activities, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002,
at A18 (describing links between terrorism and increased FBI surveillance). Early reactions from
legal experts and civil liberties groups generally concluded that these investigative activities would not
violate the First Amendment, but raised concerns that expanded monitoring of domestic activities
could create chilling effects on speech and association. See Adam Liptak, Changing the Standard:
Despite Civil Liberties Fears, FB.I Faces No Legal Obstacles to Domestic Spying. N.Y. TIMES, May 31.
2002, at Al (discussing impact of new guidelines on public debate and academic community). Even if
such fears are well-founded, these measures fall well short of the sort of historical incursions on First
Amendment freedoms discussed below. See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals
and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMM. 261, 288 (2002) (stating
that current Bush administration has diminished relatively few civil liberties compared with past wars
led by Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt).
4. See Terror Coverage Boosts News Media's Image: But Military Censorship Backed. SURVEY
REP. (Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press. Wash.. D.C.). Nov. 28, 2001 (summarizing polling
data), at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PagelD=10. This represents an increase from
polling data finding that thirty-eight percent of respondents favored government censorship of
national security threats in October 1985, but is less than the fifty-eight percent of respondents who
approved of government censorship in March 1991. Id.
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actions, and so should be proscribed. Indeed, as we will see below, prior
restrictions on speech in or around wartime have often aimed at a broader target
than direct incitement, and included within their ambit anything that might
conceivably be said to hamper the war effort. But recent legislative efforts have
left all of this speech unregulated.
In short, if there is anything extraordinary about the constitutional
questions that have arisen in the wake of September 11 and the concomitant
legislative responses, it is not that some civil liberties have been threatened, but
that one of our central constitutional rights has not been threatened, although
history suggests it has been among the first targets of wartime governments. In
the wealth of discussions about civil liberties that have occurred in the wake of
the attacks, this unprecedented change has gone largely unremarked. 5 What
evolution in the legal and political environment of the First Amendment can
account for this quiet but significant shift?
In this Article, I suggest that the answer to this question lies within the
study of behavioral analysis and its application to the law. 6 Loosely defined, law
and behavioral analysis is the study of real-world decision-making in the world of
law. Law and economics, perhaps the dominant paradigm of decision analysis in
law, proceeds from a model of individuals as rational actors. 7 Behavioral
analysis of law, by contrast, relaxes the assumption of rationality and proceeds
from the view that departures from rationality "can be described, used, and
sometimes even modeled."8 By examining predictable heuristics and biases in
individual and group decision-making, we can gain a new understanding of the
ways people operate under given legal regimes, the way the law succeeds and
fails in taking into account actual decision-making processes, and the path of

5. But see David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism. 38

Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that a number of commentators have pointed to the
relative lack of direct speech restrictions in the wake of September 11). Cole argues that despite
superficial shifts in the government's approach, "it would be more accurate to say that we have
adapted the mistakes of the past, substituting new forms of political repression for old ones." Id. But
the pressing question of why this shift has been necessary is not satisfactorily answered in this
otherwise instructive article. To say that the government has adopted law enforcement methods that
attack freedom of speech or association less directly because they are barred by history and the
Constitution from targeting people for their speech or associations" still raises the question of why the
courts came to set the bar so high. Id. at 8. This Article is an attempt to answer that question.
6. I use the term "behavioral analysis" here, but this body of work has been variously referred to
as "judgment and decision theory," "behavioral decision theory," "behavioral economics," and other
phrases, all denoting the same school of thought.
7. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998). Posner explains,
The task of economics, so defined, is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a
rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what we shall call his "self-interest."
Rational maximization should not be confused with conscious calculation. Economics is not
a theory about consciousness. Behavior is rational when it conforms to the model of rational
choice, whatever the state of mind of the chooser ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 1 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000).
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appropriate legal reforms.
One area in which behavioral analysis yields particularly valuable insights is
risk analysis.' 0 Assessments of risk and probability are subject to a host of
standard, predictable heuristics, which may in turn lead to biased assessments of
risk.'" For example, decision makers commonly fall prey to the availability
heuristic-a tendency to "assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an
12
event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.'
Thus, people will overestimate the likelihood of certain dramatic and disastrous
events that are subject to substantial media coverage, such as airplane disasters,
tornadoes, and nuclear meltdowns, while underestimating the higher risk of such
unexceptional events as car accidents. 13 Demands for regulation of salient risks
may thus be driven by anecdote rather than a rational assessment of risk.
Similarly, individuals tend to display hindsight bias, or "the tendency to
view what has already happened as relatively inevitable and obvious-without
realizing that retrospective knowledge of the outcome is influencing one's
judgments. 1 4 Juries and judges are regularly called upon to evaluate the
likelihood of an event ex post, as when they decide whether an alleged tortfeasor
was responsible for an accident. 15 Courts deciding whether to impose a
subsequent penalty for speech may thus, in certain cases such as those involving
incitement of unlawful action, have to decide whether a speech act was likely ex
ante to have caused consequences, such as a riot or an act of terrorism, that in
fact occurred.
Although behavioral analysis of law is a burgeoning field, so far it has been
applied primarily to private law problems, not public law issues. 16 In particular,

9. See Christine Jolls et a]., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics (sketching potential

impact of incorporating more realistic conception of human behavior in legal analysis), in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 8,13,50-51.
10. l should note that this phrase has often been used specifically with reference to professional
assessment of risks, as in the literature on environmental hazards. I use the phrase in a decidedly
broader fashion here, to refer to both expert and lay assessments of the probability of occurrence of
harm.
11. See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 131-44

(1993) (listing standard heuristics and biases and concluding that such biases underline fallibility of
probability and risk assessments).
12. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3,

11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,

1982).
13. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al.. Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in THE PERCEPITION
OF RISK 32, 37-38 (Paul Slovic ed., 2001) (discussing results of study and concluding that media
coverage distorts frequency of traumatic events); Jolls, supra note 9. at 37-38 (stating that judgments
about probabilities of environmental hazards are affected by frequency of hazard and its salience).
14. PLOUS, supra note 11, at 35.
15. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight.
(noting retroactive methodology of judicial decision making). in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS.
supra note 8. 95. passim.
16. Important recent exceptions exist to this rule. See Symposium. Getting Beyond Cynicism:
New Theories of the Regulatory State, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267 (2002) [hereinafter Symposium]
(collecting articles that apply behavioral and cognitive analysis to host of public policy issues).

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

few if any writers have asked what applications behavioral analysis may have for
issues in constitutional law, including the interpretation of the First
Amendment. 17 But there is a natural fit between behavioral analysis and First
Amendment law. Much of our current free speech jurisprudence is based on the
assumption that the government should not regulate speech because, in an
unregulated marketplace, people will be perfectly capable of responding
rationally to speech.1 8 We protect speech to ensure "that the people are aware
19
of all the issues before them and the arguments on both sides of these issues."
Though Justice Holmes doubtless did not intend to subscribe to the ideal of the
perfection of human reason, this tradition is closely related to his famous
metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas"-that "the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. ' 20 But
First Amendment jurisprudence must contend with the unmistakable truth that
people are not rational, and that the individual can in fact be "irrational, a
captive of emotion rather than reflection, capable of being 'swept away by
21
hysterical, emotional appeals."'
Criticism of the marketplace of ideas metaphor is now commonplace. What
this Article proposes is not. For the purposes of this Article, what is important is
that individuals are predictably irrational. Thus, behavioral analysis can provide
the tools for a new positive analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence-how it

17. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler suggest, however, that behavioral analysis might be able to explain
the law's imposition of a high bar against prior restraints of speech, because the endowment effect
suggests that "[a] prosecutor who has sought an injunction may be particularly insistent on ensuring
that punishment occurs." Jolls, supra note 9,at 36; see also Owen D. Jones, The Evolution of
Irrationality,41 JURIMETRICS J. 289, 314 (2001) (suggesting that combination of behavioral analysis
and evolutionary theory may have implications for free expression); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative
Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74-77 (2000) (exploring potential speech

implications of behavioral phenomenon of group polarization); Cass R. Sunstein. Informing America:
Risk, Disclosure,and the FirstAmendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653,671-76 (1993) (addressing First

Amendment implications of recommendation that government take more active role in compelling
disclosures and providing information of its own with respect to social phenomena). See generally
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:A

Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998) (reviewing literature that applies behavioral
psychology to legal terrain).
18. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE

L.J. 877, 881 (1963) ("In the traditional theory, freedom of expression is not only an individual but a
social good. It is, to begin with, the best process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth").
John Milton writes the following:
And though all the winds of doctrine were letloose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in
the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her
and Falsehood grapple: who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open
encounter?
John Milton, Aereopagitica,in 32 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 381,409 (Robert Maynard

Hutchins ed., 1952).
19. OWEN Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 5 (1996) (describing, but not subscribing to, the traditional

social view of free speech).
20. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. Paul Horwitz, Citizenship and Speech, 43 MCGILL L.J. 445, 463-64 (1998) (book review)

(quoting R. v. Keegstra, [19901 S.C.R. 697, 747 (internal quotation and citation omitted)).

2003]

FREE SPEECH AS RISK ANALYSIS

has developed, why it has developed as it has, and where it should go.
Behavioral analysis can give us some idea of how and when people will be
incapable of responding rationally to speech in the marketplace of ideas.
Equally important, behavioral analysis suggests that we must give thought to the
biases of all the players in the marketplace: speakers and listeners, legislators
and judges.
To return to the principal theme of this Article, one reason we have seen no
speech-restrictive measures in the wake of September 11 is that the First
Amendment safeguards for political speech that may incite violence or impede
war efforts have been ratcheted so high that a successful conviction for such
speech is almost impossible to obtain. The story of how this area of the law has
become so protective is one of the central narratives of First Amendment
history. 22 In a series of cases early in the twentieth century, arising out of speech
protesting American entry into World War I, as well as prosecutions arising out
of the "Red Scare" following the Russian Revolution, judges began forging tests
for the constitutionality of speech constituting "illegal advocacy" of violent and
23
non-violent resistance to the government.
In a landmark series of dissents that eventually became law, the courts
developed an increasingly strict version of a test demanding that government
show a "clear and present danger" of imminent harm before it can successfully
bar speakers from inciting others to resist government actions. Two significant
themes touched on in these cases, both of which are discussed more fully below,
were how grave and imminent the risk of danger must be before the government
can prosecute, and what degree of deference courts must assign to both juries
and legislators in determining the acceptable level of risk. Although this test was
hailed for providing protection to unpopular speakers in times of emergency, its
effectiveness was called into question once another perceived emergency arose.
In the face of concerns over domestic Communism in the early days of the Cold
War, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the clear and present danger test to
permit government regulation of speech as long as the perceived risk of harm is
sufficiently great, even if the actual likelihood the speech would result in the
danger the regulation was intended to avert was small. Again, the central
themes over which the Court contended were the level of risk that should subject
speech to restriction, and to whom the task of evaluating that risk should be
assigned-judges, juries, or legislators. Finally, in Brandenburg v. Ohio24 and
Hess v. Indiana,25 the Court revisited the test for illegal advocacy, arriving at a
22. See infra Part II for a mapping of the genealogy of free speech doctrine from the perspective
of behavioral analysis.
23. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 57 (1998) (stating that modern First

Amendment doctrine is "intellectual child" of early twentieth century judges who recognized
centrality of free speech to democratic society): CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM

OF FREE SPEECH 23 (1993) ("Holmes and Brandeis wrote extraordinary dissenting opinions, rejecting
the conventional view that government could ban political speech merely because the speech was
dangerous.").
24. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
25. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
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test that explicitly speaks in terms of risk analysis, permitting the regulation of
advocacy of violence only when it is directed to inciting imminent lawless action
and is likely to produce such action. 26 Over the same period, the courts became
increasingly distrustful of the risk analysis capacity of both legislators and juries,
and increasingly seized the power to evaluate whether the speech met the test.
This analysis thus supports the conclusion that a fruitful way to examine the
development of the strictly protective test for illegal advocacy is as an example of
the evolution of the law in a way that recognizes and guards against the
predictable shortcomings in our ability to perform accurate risk analysis that
27
behavioral analysts have highlighted.
But this Article also suggests that other areas of First Amendment law have
failed to adequately acknowledge and account for these same tendencies. One
such area is commercial speech doctrine. In one sense, both illegal advocacy
doctrine and commercial speech doctrine might be viewed as similar: both lines
of cases have seen the Court moving toward an increasingly speech-protective
approach to the speech at issue. As this Article argues, however, they differ in
an important respect: while the illegal advocacy doctrine evolved to account for
and guard against cognitive shortcomings, commercial speech doctrine
increasingly has failed to recognize the effect of these shortcomings on
consumers.
In the end, a behavioral analysis-based treatment of these areas of First
Amendment jurisprudence, rather than one based on history or on the standard
tropes of First Amendment theory, helps focus our attention on two central
questions that range across the whole field of First Amendment law: (1) how do
we craft restrictions on speech that appropriately measure the extent of the risk
generated by the speech in question; and (2) how do we evaluate the respective
propensity of different players in the system of free speech-judges, juries, and
legislators-to suffer from the cognitive illusions that hamper their ability to
measure risk?
By taking this approach, we may therefore sweep aside some of the

26. For a column addressing Brandenburg in the context of September 11. see Julie Hilden,
September 11, The First Amendment, and the Advocacy of Violence, WRIT, Dec. 27, 2001, available at

http://writ.findlaw.com/hilden/20011227.html.
27. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79
OR. L. REv. 61. 63 (2000). Rachlinski notes:

Many professions develop procedures to compensate for the limitations of human judgment.
Over the centuries of their existence, common-law courts might have done the same. Like
engineering, the law is a learned profession with a long tradition that presumably has had the
opportunity to learn from its mistakes. This observation implies that the law has adapted to
cognitive illusions of judgment. Such illusions would not, therefore, provide a basis for
advocating widespread reform efforts, although they would facilitate an understanding of
how the law has developed.
Id.; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87 CORNELL

L. REV. 671, 678 (2002) ("It is no stretch to think of the law, particularly the incremental case-centered
process of common-law reasoning, as just that sort of experience-based expertise that should be
expected to approach (through hesitating and uneven steps) sensible mechanisms to overcome some
of the frailties of individual human actors.").
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prevailing metaphors of First Amendment theory, and realize the benefits of a
new guiding metaphor for First Amendment analysis, in which First Amendment
law is a species of risk analysis.2 8 Equally important, we may gain some insight
into a central question that may come to take center stage in thinking about the
application of behavioral analysis in the law: the question of institutional
analysis. Not all players suffer from the same cognitive illusions at the same time
or in the same degree. In considering proposals for legal reform based on
behavioral analysis, we must therefore ask which institution should be assigned
decision-making responsibility in given cases, and how we can structure formal
and informal institutions to moderate the effect of the cognitive illusions to
29
which we are all subject.
Part II of this Article presents a summary of some basic findings of
behavioral analysis, including a discussion of some basic cognitive illusions that
may hamper our ability to rationally analyze risk. Part III returns to the
development of illegal advocacy doctrine, and demonstrates that it has closely
tracked the specific concerns with risk analysis that are the subject of much of
the work in behavioral analysis. As the law of illegal advocacy has developed, it
has gradually accounted for the distorting effects of cognitive illusion by
tightening the requirements for a successful conviction, and by assigning the
primary responsibility for performing risk analysis to the courts. 30 Part IV offers
a contrasting examination of an area of law in which behavioral analysis may
counsel a departure from current First Amendment jurisprudence, in a less
speech-protective direction: commercial speech. Thus, by contrasting the
doctrine of illegal advocacy with the doctrine of commercial speech, this Article
suggests that the two central questions raised above may sometimes result in
different approaches to different varieties of speech, and in varied assignments
of institutional responsibility. Part V examines some implications of the
behavioral approach, and offers a response to some potential objections to
behavioral theory and some suggestions about why we may benefit from a
28. For a recent book arguing that the government, and particularly the United States
government, has a pervasive and important, but often unrecognized role in managing risk, see DAVID
A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILs: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 1-21 (2002).
29. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 27, at 671-72 (arguing that, so far, "the literature has had relatively
little to say about the role of institutional mechanisms that may buffer or even neutralize defective
heuristics that can dominate individual decision making"). But see Symposium. supra note 16
(addressing institutional concerns arising in the intersection between behavioral analysis and
administrative law): Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. &

ECON. REV. 115, 146 (1999) (believing that "[t]here is also good reason to consider institutional
arrangements that might insulate government from some of the unfortunate effects of cognitive and
motivational errors."): id. at 150 (asking, "What institutions work best at reducing the effects of
biases?").
30. A separate, and important, question arising in this area is how far the Brandenburg line of
cases should apply. Should the Brandenburg test apply to conduct that falls outside the narrow scope

of expressly political speech urging unlawful conduct? See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d
233, 250 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting direct application of Brandenburg test in suit against publisher of
manual offering instruction to would-be professional killers). That question, however, lies outside the
scope of this Article, which focuses solely on classic instances of politically motivated advocacy of
unlawful conduct.
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behavioralist approach to First Amendment doctrine.

II. A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS PRIMER

Before moving to the doctrinal areas that are the subject of this Article, it
may be useful to provide a capsule review of the analytical approach that will be
applied to them. This Part summarizes some of the key findings of behavioral
analysis, building from a discussion of the settled assumptions about rationality
that still regularly form the foundation for legal analysis to a look at some of the
cognitive shortcomings that have been identified and modeled by the leading
behavioral research. In addition, this Part provides a foundation for the other
major area of inquiry in this Article-the question of allocation of decisionmaking responsibility in the First Amendment. As this Part observes, not all
actors suffer from the same cognitive failings in the same degree. Thus, in
considering how well the courts have dealt with illegal advocacy and commercial
speech doctrine, we must also consider whether other institutions would be
better suited to evaluate these categories of speech. In short, as this Part
suggests, behavioral analysis may offer valuable insights into two crucial First
Amendment questions: how we decide whether particular speech acts may have
unduly harmful effects, and who should make such decisions.
A. Rationality and Bounded Rationality
The guiding assumption from which behavioral analysis departs is rational
32
choice theory-the assumption that "man is a rational maximizer of his ends."
Across a range of disciplines, including law, rational choice theory is the "central
account of human decision making." 33 Whether it is a descriptively accurate
account is the central question of behavioral analysis.
At the outset, it may be noted that multiple understandings of the term
"rationality" are relevant here. Rationality can be understood internally as a
description of how people think; ideally, at least, it suggests that individuals may

31. One important area not canvassed by this paper is the question of group decision-making.
This field of study ultimately has implications for both issues addressed in this Article: the shape and
future of First Amendment doctrine, and the question of institutional choice in the First Amendment.
Does First Amendment doctrine require reshaping to deal with the problems and benefits of group
deliberation? Must the question of institutional choice be responsive to the unique features of
deliberation among groups, as opposed to the individual decision-making that is the focus of most of
this Article? More broadly, does (or should) our understanding of the constitutional framework
recognize that a host of institutions, both formal and informal - such as appellate judicial panels,
legislators, the press, and religious and other closely tied communities - may impose a sense of group
identity on their members despite the otherwise heterogeneous nature of these groups? These and
other related questions are the subject of future work, so I shall set them aside for present purposes.
For useful discussion of these questions, however, see generally, Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, supra
note 17; Cass R. Sunstein, CONFORMITY AND DISSENT (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working
Paper No. 164 (2d ser. 2002), availableat http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html.
32. POSNER, supra note 7, at 3.
33. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060 (2000).
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apply models of careful and logical reasoning in making decisions. 34 From an
external perspective, however-the perspective that is relevant to the work of
law and economics, and whose predictive power is called into question by
behavioral analysis-rationality "is not a theory about consciousness. ' 35 It is an
objective concept that does not depend on the actual state of mind of the
decision maker. 36 It is simply the assumption that, in the aggregate at least,
"people respond to incentives-that if a person's surroundings change in such a
way that he could increase his satisfactions by altering his behavior, he will do
' 37
SO."
Rationality is thus a predictive model, standing outside the actual
processes of cognition, which makes certain assumptions about the direction in
which people's decisions will proceed. 38 It is also, however, a model of how
people's thinking would proceed, if they were living up to the assumed human
capacity to allow one's ends to guide one's actions.
As Korobkin and Ulen note, there are a range of potential descriptions of
rational choice theory, ranging from thin to thick. 39 Rationality at its thinnest is
simply a definition of a means of thinking that "suit[s] means to ends," without
any normative theory of the means or ends in mind.40 Thicker theories of
rationality do posit some of the means and ends. For example, some versions of
rational choice theory assume that individuals act to maximize their self42
interest, 4' or more specifically still, that they act to maximize their wealth.
In the middle of this spectrum lies one of the most popular and prevalent
definitions of rationality, expected utility theory, which has been called "the
major paradigm in decision making since the Second World War. '43 This theory
holds that in making decisions, "decision makers conduct an explicit or implicit
cost-benefit analysis of competing options and select the optimal method of
achieving their goals. .. subject to external constraints. '" 44 It assumes a number
of further principles: (1) rational actors will order alternatives by preference,
assuming they are not indifferent between the two; (2) rational actors will never
adopt decisions or decision-making strategies that are weaker than other
decisions or strategies-that is, that result in a poorer outcome; (3) rational

34. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 17 (providing definition of rationality as ability and desire to use
reason to carry on life).
35. Id. at 4.
36. See id. at 4, 17 (discussing concept of rationality).
37. Id. at 4; see also JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 55 (3d ed. 2000) (describing
rational methods as "those that are generally best in achieving the thinker's goals").
38. See Baron, supra note 37, at 5 (explaining that "rational" means what one would do to
achieve one's goals if aware of one's own best interests).
39. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1061; see also Sunstein, supra note 29, at 148 (noting that
the notion of rationality "is quite ambiguous, at least until it is specified").
40. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1061.
41. See id. at 1064-66 (discussing self-interest version of rationality).
42. See id. at 1066 (discussing effect of desire for wealth on rationality).
43. Paul J.H. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and
Limitations,20 J. ECON. LITERATURE. 529, 529 (1982).
44. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33 at 1062-63.
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actors will ignore the common aspects of alternative outcomes when deciding
between them; (4) rational actors will choose transitively: within a set of ordered
preferences, if they prefer A to B, they will prefer A to C; (5) a rational actor
will prefer a gamble between best and worst outcomes to a moderate but sure
outcome, if the odds of the best outcome are high enough; and (6) rational actors
45
will not be affected by the order in which alternatives are presented.
Economists regularly concede that their assumptions of rationality can be
"one-dimensional and pallid when viewed as descriptions of human behavior,"
46
while insisting on their usefulness as a set of predictive assumptions.
Behavioral analysis proposes to add color and depth to the picture of judgment
and decision-making. 47 But it goes further than that, arguing that standard
versions of rationality are less predictively accurate than is generally assumed
and that behavioral analysis can provide a better set of descriptive and
prescriptive models. 48 It emphasizes a number of ways in which individuals
depart from a standard economic model of rationality.49 In particular, it
emphasizes the ways in which decision-making is flawed because human beings
are flawed. Individuals regularly lack perfect information in making decisions,
and would not be infinitely skilled at weighing that information even if they had
it. Their memories are finite and subject to distortion and failure. Moreover,
they lack the time to conduct the kind of analysis that would lead to a perfectly
"rational" decision (to the degree it could be considered "rational" to expend
such resources on any given decision). 50 Thus, individuals are capable only of
"bounded rationality," and so will make decisions hobbled by their limited
cognitive capacities, resulting in outcomes that would be sub-optimal according
to expected utility theory. 5' The decision-making shortcuts that are the result of
52
our bounded rationality will be the main concern of this Article.
45. See PLOUS, supra note 11, at 81-82 (discussing principles upon which expected utility theory is
based); see also REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

18, 43-45 (2001) (outlining rational choice criteria and examining future probability decision tree).
46. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 17-18 (discussing economic theory).

47. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 17, at 310 (stating that rational actor model of human behavior
works well when people act rationally but varies when people act differently; therefore, behavioral
economics may provide better model).
48. See William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Decision Research: Some
Historical Context, in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS,

AND CONTROVERSIES 3, 11 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997) (arguing that this
schism has been present since birth of expected utility theory).
49. See Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 11 (1998)

(arguing that psychology can teach us how individuals differ from their traditional economic
description).
50. See PLOUS, supra note 11, at 94-95 (noting some flaws in expected utility theory); Jolls, supra
note 9, at 14-15 (discussing concept of bounded rationality).
51. Jolls, supra note 9, at 14; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1075-76. The phrase is Herbert
Simons's. See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99
(1955) (proposing modification of traditional economic theory postulates of economic man and
coining phrase "bounded rationality").
52. Cf.Jolls, supra note 9, at 16 ("Bounded rationality as it relates to judgment behavior will
come into play whenever actors in the legal system are called upon to assess the probability of an
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In addition, individuals are capable only of "bounded willpower." Because
of such traits as habit, addiction, and other visceral drives, they will not always
act in accordance with their long-term self-interest. They will smoke, engage in
other unhealthy or high-risk behavior, and waste money. 53 This cognitive
limitation will come into play when we discuss the insights behavioral analysis
may offer into the First Amendment's treatment of commercial speech. Finally,
and more controversially, behavioral analysis suggests that, contrary to classic
rational choice theory, individuals exhibit "bounded self-interest"-that is, the
expectation that they will act in their own self-interest will regularly be bounded
54
by such non-instrumental concerns as fairness.
B. Heuristics, Biases, and Other Standard Features of Behavioral Analysis
Given the limitations on time, information, and cognitive capacity suggested
by the concept of bounded rationality, individuals attempt to cope with these
deficiencies by using "mental shortcuts and rules of thumb. '55 These shortcuts,
which have been dubbed "heuristics," 56 form the cornerstone of the work of
57
modern behavioral analysts such as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.
Of course, there is nothing irrational in the use of shortcuts.5 8 It often
makes more sense to operate according to mental shorthand than to expend the
time and effort it takes to arrive at an optimal decision: It makes more sense, for
example, to drive between home and work by the same reasonably effective
route than to seek out and choose between every possible alternative route, or to
consult traffic and weather reports every day when deciding how to get home.
Heuristics "reduce the time and effort required to make reasonably good
judgments and decisions." 59 Experimental work in behavioral analysis has
yielded a number of common, predictable heuristics that regularly figure in
individuals' decisions, some of which are described below.
But shortcuts sometimes fail. In some cases, they lead to "biases"erroneous conclusions that lead to departures from the ideal outcomes that

uncertain event.").
53. See id. at 15 (discussing effects of human will-power on rationality); Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 33, at 1113-19 (discussing effects of habit, tradition, addiction, and craving on rationality).
54. See Jolls, supra note 9, at 16 (discussing effect of fairness on human rationality).
55. Id. at 14.
56. See, e.g., BARON, supra note 37, at 50 (discussing coining of this term by George Polya).
57. For a recent updated collection of papers on this phenomenon, see HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
58. See PLOUS, supra note 11, at 109 (arguing that shortcuts reduce time and effort necessary to
make good decisions); Jolls, supra note 9, at 14 (stating that humans use shortcuts to deal with limited
brain power and time); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology
for Risk Regulation (discussing human risk analysis and heuristics), in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 8, 325, 327.
59. PLOUS, supra note 11. at 109; see also Noll & Krier, supra note 58, at 327 (stating that use of
shortcuts is not necessarily irrational because it saves information-processing and decision-analysis
costs).
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would be prescribed by theories of rational decision-making. 6° Of particular
importance, heuristics regularly lead to systematic biases. 61 Behavioral analysis
not only charts the common rules of thumb by which people make decisions
under conditions of bounded rationality, but also provides a basis for predictions
concerning how they will depart from favored outcomes under standard rational
62
choice theories of decision-making.
Although a host of sources of bias or error have been catalogued, 63 this
section will focus on only a few of the heuristics and biases that have been
identified and confirmed by repeated experiment. A number of the heuristics
and biases described below will figure prominently in any consideration of the
insights behavioral analysis may offer First Amendment law.
1. The Availability Heuristic
The heuristic most relevant to this Article is the availability heuristic,
defined as "a rule of thumb in which decision makers 'assess the frequency of a
class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or
occurrences can be brought to mind. '64 This is frequently an accurate rule of
thumb; an event may be easily recalled because it is, in fact, common.65 But the
individual's tendency to evaluate the likelihood of an event according to the ease
with which examples come to mind, and the possibility that factors such as the
vivid or emotional content of an event will make it especially "available" to the
decision maker's recall, often results in errors in the individual's estimation of
66
probability.
The availability heuristic has been observed across a range of experiments.

60. See Noll & Krier, supra note 58, at 327 (arguing that these shortcuts often lead to inferior
decisions compared to those that would have been reached without shortcuts); see also Sunstein, supra
note 29, at 139 (noting that "[h]euristics are not biases, and often they are good, because they
economize on decision costs; but they can lead to several mistakes").
61. PLOUS, supra note 11, at 109.
62. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 9, at 14 (rational use of mental shortcuts can still produce
"predictablemistakes") (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, On Cognitive Illusions and Their
Implications (noting that one source has defined "at least 27 sources of bias or error in judgment and
decision making"), in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 592, 593
(Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed., 2000).
64. PLOUS, supra note 11, at 121 (quoting Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 12, at 11); see also
RICHARD NISBETrr & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL

JUDGMENT 18-19 (1980) (describing availability heuristic); Sunstein, supra note 29, at 139 (citing
Tversky & Kahneman). For a careful recent study of the availability heuristic, see Norbert Schwarz &
Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as
Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT, supranote 57, 103, passim.

65. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1087 (discussing effect of rationality on jurors).
66. See NISBETr & Ross, supra note 64, at 19 (pointing out that availability heuristic can be
misleading because many factors uncorrelated with frequency can influence ease with which
occurrences can be brought to mind). See generally HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 45, ch. 4 (examining

various factors influencing judgments from memory).
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For example, Tversky and Kahneman conducted an experiment in which
respondents were asked whether it is more likely that a word starts with the
letter K, or that a word has the letter K as its third letter. Although there are
twice as many words in the latter category as there are in the former, 105 of the
152 people surveyed thought more words would begin with K-a result
attributed to the comparative ease with which people can come up with words
beginning with a letter as opposed to one seated somewhere in the middle of a
word.

67

Although this is a trivial example, the heuristic has been observed leading to
miscalculation of probability in instances that may lead to a misallocation of
scarce public resources. For example, an experiment in which individuals were
asked to evaluate which of two potentially lethal events is more likely showed
that people overestimated the risk of accidents, cancer, botulism, and tornadoes,
all vivid events subject to intense media coverage, while underestimating the risk
of commonplace but non-vivid events that receive little media coverage, such as
asthma and diabetes, which in fact are significant causes of death. Spectacular,
multi-victim events such as fires were assumed to be considerably more frequent
than commonplace single-victim events such as drowning. In fact, both occur
with approximately equal frequency. 68 In sum, "[i]n making risk assessments,
individuals will often allow 'available' evidence to trump much more probative
'69
statistical information of which they are aware.
2. The Representativeness Heuristic
Individuals tend to judge the frequency or likelihood of something
according to how much it resembles something else. Because other factors
besides resemblance often are more relevant in a given case to the ultimate
calculation of probability, this heuristic can lead to error.70 For example, in a
classic study, respondents were provided with the following information:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear
demonstrations. Please check off the most likely alternative:
__

Linda is a bank teller.

__

71
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.

67. See PLOUS, supra note 11, at 122 (discussing study reported in Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 12, 163, 166-67).

68. See Slovic, supra note 13, at 37-38 (discussing ratios and providing table listing judgments of
relative frequency for selected pairs of lethal events).
69. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 663 (1999).
70. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 12, at 4 (noting errors resulting from such an approach
to judgment of probability because similarity cannot be influenced by several factors that should affect
judgments of probability).
71. PLOUS, supranote 11,at 110.
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The vast majority of respondents concluded Linda was more likely to be a
bank teller and feminist than just a bank teller. Even after additional
experiments were conducted to account for the possibility that people
interpreted "Linda is a bank teller" to mean "bank teller who is not active in the
feminist movement," people still assumed it was more likely Linda was a feminist
bank teller than a bank teller. 72 On reflection, this answer cannot be right as a
statistical matter, since it cannot be more likely that Linda is both a bank teller
and feminist than that she is either a bank teller or a feminist. 73 Behavioral
analysts have concluded from these and other experiments that people are more
likely to attach significance to the amount of detail in a scenario because that
detail makes the scenario more representative, even though the increased detail
74
also makes the probability of an event less likely.
Another consequence of the representativeness heuristic is the tendency to
believe in the "law of small numbers." Individuals tend to believe that random
samples will resemble each other and the general population more than
statistical analysis suggests they will. For example, when asked to write down a
simulated short sequence of coin tosses, people will tend to include alternations
between heads and tails, and exclude long runs of either heads or tails, in an
effort to create randomness in the small sample, even though statistical analysis
suggests otherwise. 75 This can lead individuals to commit the gambler'sfallacythe belief that after a streak of good or bad luck, the reverse outcome is more
76
likely, even where the outcome is completely random, as in a roll of the dice.
Like the other heuristics and resultant biases discussed here, the
77
representativeness heuristic can have consequences for public policy.
Individuals will tend to overestimate the importance of patterns in random
events and to assign too much significance to irrelevant details even when they
are made aware of base rate probabilities. 78 In short, in calculating probabilities
they are likely to steadily and predictably misinterpret the odds when factors
giving rise to the representativeness heuristic are present.

72. Id. at 110-11. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by
Representativeness (discussing representativeness heuristic), in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 12, 84.

73. See PLOUS, supra note 11, at 110-11 (discussing illogic of survey results).
74. See, e.g., id. at 111 (discussing effect of inclusion of greater detail in survey questions).
75. PLOUS, supra note 11, at 112.

76. Id. at 113; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers
(discussing how most people irrationally view small random sample as highly representative), in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 12, 23, passim.
77. Cf Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 571 (2002) (noting how "policymaking structures and practices that
fail to acknowledge the threat posed by illusions of judgment, and to employ measures that counteract
human cognitive limitations, will generate improvident regulatory policy").
78. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 69, at 667 (arguing that desire to see patterns in random
events causes decisionmakers to have unrealistic expectations about "the replicability of prior
beneficial experiences").
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3. Optimistic Bias
In evaluating the probability of various events, individuals regularly exhibit
an optimistic bias: "the belief that good things are more likely than average to
79
happen to us and bad things are less likely than average to happen to us."
Even when individuals are fully informed as to the actual probability of an event,
they will still be unduly optimistic that such negative possibilities as car
accidents, heart attacks, or AIDS infection (even among fully informed members
of high-risk communities) will not happen to them, while positive events such as
owning their own home will occur. 80 Overconfidence can thus impact public
policy by encouraging individuals to underestimate the preventive measures they
ought to take in their own lives to avoid significant risks, and requiring the law to
set deterrent penalties high enough to compensate for overconfidence. 8
A related observed bias is the confirmatory or self-serving bias-the
tendency to prefer information that is consistent with one's previously held
views, or to interpret information in ways that confirm those views.82 This bias
may affect both judicial reception of arguments that favor or disfavor previously
held views, and litigants' own reception of additional information through the
discovery process, which may increase each side's own confidence in its
83
likelihood of success rather than encourage reasonable settlement discussion.
4. Hindsight Bias
Everyone is familiar with the

phenomenon of "Monday

morning

79. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1091.
Korobkin and Ulen refer to this as
"overconfidence bias" rather than optimistic bias. I have used the latter term to distinguish this bias
from a separate bias relating to overconfidence in one's own calculation of probabilities, which is
discussed below.
80. See, e.g., PLOUS, supra note 11. at 134-35 (recognizing that people rate themselves as more
likely to experience positive events than negative events); Korobin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1091
(arguing that people generally believe that good things are more likely to happen to them than bad
things); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 4 (stating that vast majority of people believe that they are less likely
than other people to fall victim to negative events). These discussions draw largely on Neil D.
Weinstein, UnrealisticOptimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806
(1980) (discussing study revealing that people have tendency to be unrealistically optimistic about
future events).
81. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1091-93 (stating that policymakers must set penalties
higher to counteract individuals' tendencies to be overconfident). That is not to say, however, that
optimistic bias is all bad. There is at least some literature suggesting that the most successful
individuals are likely to display unrealistic optimism, while individuals who accurately evaluate their
own personal abilities tend to suffer from clinical depression. E.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note
8, 288, 292, 300 nn.25-26; Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms) (discussing these
findings and noting that they are "not uncontroversial") in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 8,144, 155, 166 n.39.
82. See, e.g., PLOUS, supra note 11, at 231-34 (discussing concept of self-fulfilling prophecies);
Korobkin & Ulen, supranote 33, at 1093 (same).
83. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1093-94 (discussing concept of self-serving bias).
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quarterbacking." Experiments in behavioral analysis have demonstrated that
this phenomenon, called "hindsight bias," occurs with some regularity. Once an
event has occurred, individuals overestimate the likelihood that that event would
have occurred. 84 They also tend to "overestimate the ex ante prediction that they
had concerning the likelihood of an event's occurrence after learning that it
actually did occur." 85 For example, in an early study, five groups were given a
description of the events leading to a 19th Century war between the British and
the Gurkas in Nepal. Each was asked the likelihood that each of four specific
outcomes would have resulted. Four of the groups were told that a different
specified outcome had occurred, while the fifth group was told nothing. The
subjects in each of the groups who were given a specified outcome gave an
estimate of that outcome that was higher than the prediction for that outcome
made by the control group. 86 Indeed, not only do people tend to overestimate
the ex ante likelihood of an event once they are aware of the outcome, but they
also come to misrecall their own ex ante predictions to make them more
87
accurate.
As Jeffrey Rachlinski's discussion illustrates, hindsight bias is a classic
problem for the courts, which after all "primarily judge in hindsight. '88 Judges
and jurors are regularly called upon to assign tort liability after an accident has
occurred, but according to the standard of whether the alleged tortfeasor's
conduct was reasonable when it occurred. Hindsight bias regularly leads factfinders to assume that the actor's conduct was unreasonable if an accident did in
fact occur, and that it was reasonable if no accident occurred-although whether
the accident occurred or not should be irrelevant. 89
5. Anchoring and Adjustment
What is the exact percentage of African countries in the United Nations?
And what connection does this question have to a wheel of fortune? Consider
this experiment, conducted by Tversky and Kahneman. A set of subjects was
confronted with a wheel of fortune, which was spun and landed on sixty-five.
They were first asked whether the percentage of African countries in the U.N.
was more or less than sixty-five percent, and then what the exact percentage was.
These respondents gave a median estimate of forty-five percent. Another set of
subjects was faced with a wheel of fortune that landed on ten. They gave a
84. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 15, at 95 (discussing psychological research on judging in
hindsight).
85. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1095; see also Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to
Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight (stating that past is often viewed by people as
"having repetitive elements"), in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra
note 12, 335, 336.
86. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1095-96.
87. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 69, at 659-60 (discussing effect of hindsight bias).
88. Rachlinski, supra note 15, at 99.
89. Id.; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1096-97 (arguing that if jurors are affected by
hindsight bias, defendants may be found negligent in situation where they acted in a socially
responsible way, but simply had bad luck).
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This example illustrates the
median estimate of twenty-five percent. 90
phenomenon of anchoring and adjustment: individuals who are asked to estimate
a number often "anchor" on an original starting value, and then fail to adjust
sufficiently up or down from this original starting point. 91 This is true even when
the anchor is arbitrarily chosen, or is outrageously extreme. 92 Juries deliberating
the damage
on damage awards may center on an "anchor" figure, thus skewing
93
determination toward that number, even if it is too low or high.
C. Behavioral Problems and Risk Analysis
The last section provided a general toolbox of cognitive illusions, and
showed that heuristics and biases are likely to figure prominently in everyday
decisions made by individuals that may be of relevance to law and public
policy-for example, decisions whether or not to engage in different forms of
risky behavior. Similarly, the cognitive illusions uncovered by behavioral
analysis may be present in decisions made throughout the legal system. These
decisions are made by legislators deciding how to allocate resources to prevent
various risks, by juries evaluating the ex ante reasonableness of an alleged
tortfeasor's conduct following an accident, and by judges making a range of
factual determinations or framing rules that will govern people's conduct and
decision-making in the future.
Here, I wish to focus on one specific aspect of behavioral analysis: the
question of how people evaluate risk. To be sure, some of the heuristics
discussed above have already been shown to be pertinent to, and potentially a
distorting factor in, the decision maker's analysis of risk and probability. Since
that question forms the basis for a significant part of this Article's discussion of
the behavioral aspects of free speech jurisprudence, however, a closer look is
needed. This discussion thus refers back to some of the heuristics that have been
discussed above, but provides additional detail and some additional behavioral
insights into the common and predictable features of the decision-making
94
process that may distort judgment.
The starting point for this discussion is, once again, the availability heuristic.
Recall that under this heuristic, "one judges the probability of an event.., by
the ease with which relevant instances are imagined or by the number of such
instances that are readily retrieved from memory." 95 While this heuristic often
leads to accurate risk assessments, the availability of an event "is also affected by
recency, emotional saliency and other subtle factors that may be unrelated to

90.
91.
92.
93.

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, supra note 12, at 14-15.
See PLOUS, supra note 11, at 145 (pointing out effect of anchoring and adjustment).
Id. at 146.
See Sunstein, supra note 8,at 5 (discussing concept of anchoring and its effect on juries).

94. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, passim (2002)

(reviewing PAUL SLOVIC. THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)) (observing that "because of predictable
features of human cognition, ordinary people deal poorly with the topic of risk).
95. Paul Slovic et al., Decision Processes, Rationality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards, in THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 13, 1,13.
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actual frequency." 96 Significantly, because these factors regularly apply to
increase an individual's perception of the frequency and probability of an event,
"use of the availability heuristic results in predictable systematic biases in
97

judgment.
A number of factors that lead to overestimation of probability and risk in
conditions in which the availability heuristic applies are likely to be present in
situations in which the legal system may seek to restrict speech, or less
controversially, to devote social resources to reducing one risk over another.
Thus, in a study conducted by Paul Slovic and his co-authors in which people
were asked which of two causes of death produced more fatalities,
"overestimated items were dramatic and sensational whereas underestimated
items tended to be unspectacular events which claim one victim at a time and are
common in non-fatal form." 98 Thus, "highly publicized events make people
fearful of statistically small risks," 99 such as the risk of airplane accidents as
compared to, say, the risk of death from heart disease.
Vividness is another key ingredient of the availability heuristic. A vivid
event is one that is highly concrete and imaginable, or (which will often be the
same thing) emotionally interesting or exciting, or close in space or time. 1°°
Studies by behavioral analysts "have shown that decision makers are affected
more strongly by vivid information than by pallid, abstract, or statistical
information.' ' 10 1 Especially pertinent for legislative and judicial evaluations of
risk in situations which are likely to elicit legal restrictions on speech are
"particularly vivid crimes or terrorist actions," which may have "a
disproportionate influence on judgments" as compared to more pallid event data
10 2
such as crime statistics.
In a series of pathbreaking studies of risk analysis, Paul Slovic has
uncovered a host of experientally based "intuitive judgments, emotional
responses, and other subtle, nonconscious reactions to external stimuli" that will
tend to distort people's evaluation of risky events. 10 3 These reactions are
collectively known as "affect."'' ° 4 Thus, risks may be perceived as less acceptable

96. Id. at 14.
97. Id.
98. Paul Slovic et al., Rating the Risks, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 13, 104, 107.

99. Sunstein, supra note 94, at 1127.
100. See PLOUS, supra note 11, at 125-26 (discussing concept of vividness and how it affects
decision making).
101. Id. at 126 (citing NISBET" & Ross, supra note 64). Nisbett and Ross identify the following
factors as prime contributors to vivid information: "it [the event] is (a) emotionally interesting, (b)
concrete and imagery-provoking, and (c) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way." NISBETr
& ROSS, supra note 64,at 45.
102. Id.
103. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 69, at 669 (citing Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison
of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of Information Processingin Judgment, 6 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 649, 712-16 (1971)).
104. Id. (citing Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and Psychodynamic Unconscious,
49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 710-13 (1994)).
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when, for example, they are "dread" risks-risks "characterized by a 'perceived
lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the
inequitable distribution of risks and benefits."' 0 5 Whether a risk is unknown or
new may also contribute to an affective response to risk, as may the number of
people who could be exposed to the risk. 10 6 Slovic argues that these affective
responses to risk may not be evidence of ordinary people's inability to evaluate
risk as compared to experts. 10 7 Another response to the same evidence,
however, is that the sort of factors that lead to affective perception of risk are
those that are likely to bring an event readily to mind, and thus under the
availability heuristic create a heightened fear of risk. 10 8 In any event, whether
affective responses to risk constitute a subtle rival response to risk as compared
to experts' responses to the same events or not, these responses still constitute a
departure from purely probabilistic evaluations of risk.
Cass Sunstein has proposed another category of predictable departure from
accurate risk evaluation: Sometimes people focus on the worst case scenario,
which triggers strong emotions. When this is so, "people do not give sufficient
10 9
consideration to the likelihood that the worst case will actually occur."
Sunstein distinguishes this phenomenon, dubbed "probability neglect," from the
availability heuristic: while that heuristic leads individuals to substitute the
question of whether salient examples come readily to mind for the question of
what the actual statistical risk of an event is, under conditions of probability
neglect the question of probability will simply be irrelevant to the actor. 110 In
practice, however, it may be impossible to tell which phenomenon is at issue,
since the outcome will be the same.1 ' Probability neglect is likely to occur when
strong emotions, such as fear, are present. 112 In particular, "vivid images and
concrete pictures of disaster can 'crowd out' other kinds of thoughts, including
the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is really small." 113 One likely
triggering source of the kinds of vivid images that can trigger disproportionate
fear of statistically small risks is the media: coverage of events such as terrorist

105. PLOUS, supra note 11, at 139 (quoting Paul Slovic, Perceptionof Risk, in THE PERCEPTION
OF RISK, supra note 13, 220. 225).

106. See PLOUS. supra note 11, at 139 (describing three basic dimensions connected with public
perceptions of risk).
107. See Sunstein, supra note 94, at 1138 (discussing Slovic's argument).
108. Id. at 19.
109. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotion, Worst Cases, and Law. 112 YALE L.J. 61, 67
(2002): see also Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1979 (2001) (noting that

behavioral analysis has thus far "focused on cognition rather than emotion," but noting that "some
psychologists have recently argued that cognitive biases are best analyzed as the result of emotional
dispositions or feelings").
110. Sunstein, supra note 109, at 64-65.
111. See id. at 82 (stating that in practice it is difficult to discern whether availability heuristic or
probability neglect is driving behavior).
112. See, e.g.. Eric A. Posner, Fearand the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism.25 HARV. J.L.

& PUB. POL'Y 681. 684 (2002) (stating that fear "sits uneasily with the rational actor premises of
standard accounts of risk regulation").
113. Sunstein. supra note 109, at 82.

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

attacks, including the post-September 11 threat of anthrax, is likely to drive out
any careful attention to probability and elicit a public response that may not be
14
warranted by the actual threat presented.
Finally, it should be noted that the behavioral problems associated with risk
analysis are compounded by another behavioral trait that accompanies them. As
Paul Slovic has observed, "A particularly pernicious aspect of heuristics is that
people are typically very confident about judgments based on them."' l 5 Perhaps
because they are unaware of the operation of decision-making heuristics,
individuals are regularly overconfident in the accuracy of their own judgments.
For example, the participants in a study on the causes of death also took part in a
follow-up study in which they were asked to evaluate the odds that they were
correct in their judgment between which of two risks was greater. The results
suggested that the respondents were routinely overconfident in their judgments.
Odds of 100:1 or greater were given about twenty-five percent of the time; in
fact, about one in eight of the answers given with this level of confidence were
mistaken. 116 Another study suggested that confidence and accuracy may be
closely aligned, up to confidence estimates of 3:1, but accuracy does not increase
appreciably beyond that point, even as confidence increases up to an estimate of
100:1.117 Average confidence levels may not exceed accuracy by more than ten
to twenty percent." 8 Nevertheless, in considering the cognitive frailties that may
lead people to miscalculate risk, we must also keep in mind that people may be
overconfident that their assessment of risk is correct, notwithstanding the
presence of decision-making heuristics that are likely to lead to significant error.
In sum, for a host of reasons, individuals may respond to predictable
categories of risk without appropriate regard for the likelihood that those risks
will actually come to fruition. In particular, highly salient, vivid events will lead
to fear of risk out of proportion to the conclusions that a statistical evaluation of
the same event might offer. 119 This inability to properly evaluate risk will play a
central role in our consideration in Part III of the development of First
Amendment doctrine with respect to the advocacy of unlawful conduct.
D. "Ordinary"People, "Experts" and InstitutionalActors, and Debiasing
Are all individuals equally likely to suffer the distorting effects of these
cognitive illusions? In particular, are the different actors in the legal processlegislators, judges, and juries-equally likely to miscalculate risks and
probabilities? And can anything be done to counteract the effects of common

114. See id. at 86 (explaining that when media emphasizes deaths from anthrax, there is rise in
public concern because people do "not naturally make sufficient judgments from the standpoint of
probability").
115. Paul Slovic et al., Rating the Risks, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 13, 104, 109.

116. See id. at 109-10 (discussing effects of overconfidence in decision making).
117. PLOUS, supra note 11, at 220 (examining confidence and accuracy in decision making).
118. Id. at 229.
119. See, e.g., id. at 126 (pointing out that stories about particularly vivid crimes or terrorist
actions can overshadow crime statistics).
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behavioral tics such as the availability heuristic? The answers to this question go
to the other major issue touched on in this Article: the question of what
institutional actors should be charged with evaluating risk where the First
Amendment is concerned.
The answers are mixed. First, it is clear that at least as a starting point, even
experts share in the human condition, and so are also likely to suffer from the
sort of cognitive illusions that afflict non-expert decision makers. "Cognitive
illusions influence representatives, senators, presidents-even so-called experts
are not immune. ' 120 In particular, I would suggest that where official actors such
as judges receive and evaluate information in much the same context and
manner as other "ordinary" actors, under conditions in which they are equally
susceptible to cognitive illusions and equally likely to be exposed to media
repetition of the same instances of highly vivid risks, they may also evaluate that
information through the same distorted lens. It is thus unlikely that judges and
jurors would be significantly differently situated when receiving vivid and
emotional evidence of an exceptional event, such as terrorism, and evaluating
the risk of future disasters. It is also likely that political institutions, whether or
not they suffer from the same degree of disproportionate reaction to events that
evoke cognitive illusions, will still respond disproportionately if the public outcry
is sufficiently great, regardless of the harmfulness or inefficiency of the resulting
policy. 121 By contrast, although experts may be susceptible to judgmentdistorting effects, they also have access to more information,1 22 and may have the
opportunity to evaluate that information in a calmer, more clinical environment
that is likely to evoke a less affective response. Experts and institutional actors
may thus have an edge over ordinary actors-but only a slight edge, and only in
123
particular circumstances.
The effort to craft "debiasing" techniques to ease the effect of cognitive
illusions has also been a mixed bag. There is evidence that at least some biases
120. Richard H. Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in Public Policy, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION

MAKING. supra note 63, 85, 90; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777, 782-83. 783 nn.26-27 (2001) (collecting citations for proposition that "empirical studies
demonstrate that cognitive illusions plague assessments that many professionals, including doctors,
real estate appraisers, engineers, accountants, options traders, military leaders, and psychologists,
make. Even lawyers fall prey to cognitive illusions."); cf Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati,
How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in
Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 118-38 (2002) (discussing heuristics judges employ in

order to avoid complexity).
121. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 109, at 100 (describing public-driven political response to
anthrax scare in fall of 2001).
122. See Sunstein, supra note 94, at 1136 (summarizing Slovic's discussion of lay-expert conflict).
123. In emphasizing the limited and context-sensitive advantage that institutional actors may
enjoy over ordinary individuals, I readily acknowledge that those actors may be subject to cognitive
shortcomings stemming from the very fact that they function as institutions. A rich literature explores
the special problems involved in group decision-making. That issue, and its relationship to the twin
questions of free speech doctrine and institutional choice, is the subject of future work and lies beyond
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the flaws and advantages of group decision-making in a
legal context, see, e.g.. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate

Governance. 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
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may be subject to offsetting effects. For example, hindsight bias may be
diminished when subjects are invited to explicitly consider whether and how past
events might have turned out differently. 24 Similarly, studies have shown that
overconfidence in one's own probability assessments can be improved by
repeated evaluation and feedback intended to force decision makers to stop and
consider the reasons why their judgment might be wrong. 125 In short, instilling
qualities of sober second thought may serve to reduce the effect of distorted
judgment. Experts are the most likely to find themselves with repeated access to
126
the kind of training and feedback that can assert a debiasing influence.
Nevertheless, that kind of counteracting education may not always be
available: where an outcome is not easily attributable to a particular action, or no
information is available about what the outcome would have been if a different
decision had been made, or where the decision in question was a unique, onetime choice, there will be little opportunity to improve the actor's decisionmaking skills.1 27 And while some success has been shown in reducing decision28
making bias, it is often difficult to reduce and impossible to eliminate.
Recent work has brought these questions to the door of the institution that
is the primary focus of this Article: the courtroom. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich performed an extensive study of decisionmaking by 167 federal magistrate judges. 12 9 Their study tested for the presence
of anchoring, framing (a demonstrated bias in which individuals treat equivalent
gains and losses differently, in defiance of standard rational choice expectations),
hindsight bias, the representativeness bias, and egocentric bias (the tendency to
overestimate one's abilities). 30 "[E]ach of these cognitive illusions influenced
the decision-making processes of the judges in [the] study."' 13 But they did not
all distort the judges' evaluations to an equal extent. Compared to other actors,
judges were just as susceptible to anchoring, hindsight bias, and egocentric bias,

124. PLOUS, supra note 11, at 36-37; see Rachlinski, supra note 15, at 98 (citing studies that have
reduced hindsight bias, but concluding that "the psychological research demonstrates that the
hindsight bias is an extremely robust phenomenon").
125. PLOUS, supranote 11, at 227-28.
126. See, e.g., Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 77, at 559-60 (stating that experienced decisionmakers have more of an opportunity to evaluate their decisions and gain feedback).
127. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions
(stating that effective learning requires accurate and immediate feedback about relation between the

situational conditions and the appropriate response), in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST
BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 67, 90 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987);
see also Hanson and Kysar, supra note 69 at 691-92 (explaining why this necessary information is not
always available).
128. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 33, at 1097 (detailing examples of how bias might be
limited); Daniel A. Farber, Toward A New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 292 (2001)
(suggesting that although people can be educated to correct for bias, bias can never be eliminated
altogether).
129. Guthrie, supra note 120, at 784.
130. See id. at 784 (explaining tests used to assess how cognitive illusions influence judges'
decision making abilities).
131. Id.
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but were less likely to fall prey to framing effects or the representativeness
heuristic. 32 Thus, while it may make sense to reassign decision-making
juries may
responsibility to judges rather than juries in certain circumstances,133
134
be equal or superior in decision-making competence in other cases.
Leaving the comparison between judges and juries to one side, the question
of institutional choice that echoes throughout this Article also raises the question
whether the courts generally are better- or worse-suited to perform tasks of risk
analysis than other institutions that might be assigned the role, such as
administrative agencies. Jeffrey Rachlinski and Cynthia Farina argue that they
are not better suited to perform these tasks, because their position as generalists
means that they "almost invariably occupy the position of lay
decisionmakers."' 35 As already suggested above, that situation is compounded
when juries are involved. 136 Thus, in some cases, it is preferable to assign the
central decision-making role to other institutional actors; I draw the same
37
tentative conclusion here with respect to commercial speech.
But Rachlinski and Farina also observe that judges are "experts in
procedure and law and, as members of an expert profession, will have learned a
variety of adaptations to minimize erroneous judgments on these points."' 138 As
I suggest below with respect to the development of the Brandenburg test, that
description may aptly describe some tests under the First Amendment, whose
rule-like character is suited to those tasks that judges are best suited to handle.
Because those tests are assigned to judges alone in the first instance, and subject
to independent appellate review, the jury and its potential cognitive
shortcomings do not enter into the picture. 139 Moreover, because certain
situations such as unexpected and unrepeated emergencies may affect all
decision makers in the same way, experts and government officials may not be
any better positioned to ward off cognitive illusions than any other institutional
actor. Thus, in some areas at least, judges may be the ideal decision makers,
140
provided that an appropriate set of institutional constraints is in place.
132. See id. at 816-21 (analyzing susceptibility of judges as compared to other decision makers).
133. Cf W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risks by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL

STUD. 107, 108-11 (2001) (describing research suggesting that in series of experimental situations
involving accidents, judges were less prone to erroneous risk beliefs than jurors).
134. See Guthrie, supra note 120, at 826-27 (noting that if judges taught to avoid
representativeness heuristic, they will make better decisions, but since jury deliberations are of groupdecision making nature, juries are able to fend off biases such as hindsight).
135. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 77, at 577-78.
136. See id. at 578 (examining degree of decision making assignment from judge to jury).
137. See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of why, with respect to commercial speech, it is
sometimes preferable to assign the task of risk analysis to institutional actors other than courts.
138. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 77, at 577.
139. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the Brandenburg test and why its application is not
impeded by the potential cognitive shortcomings of jury members.
140. Cf ADAM J. HIRSCH, LAWMAKING AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY 75 (Fla. State Univ. Coll.
of Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 52, Apr. 2002) (noting recent consideration by scholars
of "how the bounded rationality of juries and trial court judges-whose task it is to apply rulesshould influence the attributes of those rules"), available at htp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/
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E. Summary
The importance to law and legal reform of the findings I have summarized
should by now be clear. Legal analysis and legal reform regularly depend on
assumptions about human nature. The paradigm governing our understanding
of human judgment and decision-making has until recently been grounded in a
model of rationality whose virtue was not its conformity to actual patterns of
decision-making, but its predictable power at a general level. Behavioral
analysis departs from the rational choice paradigm by moving from empirical
evidence to more abstract propositions, not the other way around. But while
behavioral analysis may lack the comfort of an overarching theory that rationalchoice models offer, 141 it does not purport to sacrifice predictability for accuracy.
Instead, it finds empirical support for an admittedly loose, but generalizable and
predictively accurate, set of behavioral patterns that govern our capacity to make
accurate decisions, and demonstrates that in predictable circumstances
individuals will depart from standard models of rational decision-making.
Because law is ultimately a governing structure for individual and social
decision-making, understanding our tendency to err in the estimation of risk and
probability may help us understand the ways in which the law leads us to poor
outcomes. As the next section of this Article illustrates, however, it may also
illuminate the ways in which the law has already evolved to account for and
counteract cognitive illusions. But this analysis must always keep in mind the
question of who decides. Not all actors suffer equally in all circumstances from
the same biases. As always in the law, the question of which institutions we
choose to assign responsibility for making important decisions, and what
methods these institutions select to make decisions, is one we neglect at our
142
peril.
III. ILLEGAL ADVOCACY DOCTRINE: WHO BEARS THE RISK OF RISK ANALYSIS?

With this catalogue of common cognitive illusions in place, it is possible to
examine the history of the illegal advocacy doctrine with an appropriate
framework in mind. This Part thus offers a retelling of the history of the
development of illegal advocacy doctrine, moving from the initial development
of the "clear and present danger" test in the wake of World War I and the
Russian Revolution, through the significant and retrograde revisions to that test
in the early days of the Cold War era, to the culmination of this doctrine in the
Court's highly speech-protective Brandenburg test. A literal re-view of this
history through the lens of behavioral analysis leads to the conclusion that, in
this area at least, the doctrine's evolution can be seen as an effort to work itself

SSRNID306859_code020411530.pdf?abstractid=306859.
141. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 264 (2001) (noting "the

undertheorization of behavioral economics").
142. See generally NEIL H. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN

(1994) (discussing importance of institutional decision making
and allocating authority among these institutions).
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pure of tests that suffer from a propensity to fall victim to decision-making
biases. Understanding the development of illegal advocacy doctrine as a story of
the institutionalization of hedges against poor judgment under uncertainty may
help us understand why we have seen comparatively few incursions on the First
Amendment in this latest era of perceived or real emergency.
A. Schenck: The Initial Majority Approach to the Clearand Present Danger Test
The story begins in another time of perceived civil emergency-World War
On the eve of American entry into the war, the Department of Justice
raised concerns that existing law would not adequately "regulate the conduct of
the individual during war time," and proposed legislation to bar "political
agitation... of a character directly affecting the safety of the state, including
propaganda that might affect the armed forces." 144 As with the other historical
instances discussed in this section in which a perceived emergency gave birth to
speech restrictions, those concerns were by no means pure phantasms. A host of
groups actively opposed the war effort, and over 330,000 draft evaders or
delinquents were reported over the course of the American participation in
World War 1.145
The result of those concerns was the passage of the Espionage Act, two
months after the United States' entry into the war. Its provisions included a
section stating:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or
convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the
operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States
or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United
States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or
naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of
the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
1.143

both.146

The Espionage Act was amended by the Sedition Act of 1918, which
criminalized any statement made with intent to obstruct the sale of war bonds,
along with the utterance, printing, writing, or publication of any disloyal,
profane, scurrilous, or abusive language intended to cause contempt or scorn for
47
the form of government of the United States, the Constitution, or the flag.'
143. For a general treatment of the First Amendment in this period, see Robert M. Cover, The
Left, The Right and the FirstAmendment: 1918-1928,40 MD. L. REV. 349 (1981).
144. John Lord O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 REP. N.Y. STATE B. ASS'N 275, 277, 299,
300 (1919), quoted in DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTrEN YEARS 249 (1997).
145. See ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM

1870 TO THE PRESENT 105-07 (1978) (discussing extent of anti-WWI sentiment and expression thereof
by both organizations and individuals).
146. Espionage Act, ch. 30,tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 219 (1917) (repealed 1948).
147. Sedition Act, ch. 75,40 Stat. 553 (1918) (repealed 1921).
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The Act also barred statements urging the curtailment of production of war
materials with the intent of hindering the war effort, or supporting the cause of
1 8
any country at war with the United States. "
The government began prosecuting antiwar speech under these acts soon
after the United States entered World War I, primarily under section 3 of the
Espionage Act. Most prosecutions were successful. 149 Two factors led to this
high success rate, both of which are germane to this Article's thesis. First,
following the courts' existing doctrines in evaluating speech, judges instructed
juries that they should weigh the tendency of the speech to reach the results the
legislation aimed to preventl 5°-the so-called "bad tendency" test. Second, this
power to weigh the bad tendency of speech was left to the broad discretion of
jury members, 51 whose deliberation could not help but be tilted toward
conviction given the spirit of the times. Thus, the espionage prosecutions
combined a calibration of risk on a scale of mere "bad tendency," unbounded by
considerations such as the imminence of the harm at issue or the degree of risk,
with an assignment of that vague test to juries. Taken in combination, these
factors were likely to give full vent to cognitive illusions that prevented an
accurate risk determination. It is unsurprising that a high incidence of
convictions resulted.
The Supreme Court reached the First Amendment challenge to the
Espionage Act in three cases-Schenck v. United States, 152 Frohwerk v. United
States,153 and Debs v. United States. 154 Schenck, as general secretary of the
Socialist Party, was responsible for the printing and dissemination by mail of a
document sent both to drafted men and the general population. One side of the
document "recited the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment, said that the
idea embodied in it was violated by the Conscription Act and that a conscript is
little better than a convict."' 55 It urged citizens not to submit to conscription, but
"in form at least confined itself to peaceful measures such as a petition for the
repeal of the act.

'1 56

The reverse side similarly exhorted readers to assert their

rights, including their right to express opposition to the draft. 57 Schenck and
others were convicted for violating the Espionage Act's restrictions on speech
intended to cause insubordination and obstruction of the American military
effort, and for using the mails to send material determined to be "non-mailable"
58
under the Act.

148. Id.
149. RABBAN, supra note 144, at 255.
150. Id. at 257.

151. Id.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

249 U.S. 47 (1919).
249 U.S. 204 (1919).
249 U.S. 211 (1919).
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 50-51.
Id. at 51,

157. Id.
158. Id. at 48-49.
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Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes rejected the appellants' First
Amendment claim. Holmes acknowledged that the speech might be lawful in
other circumstances, but stated, "[T]he character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic," 159 His next statement, which would prove to be the jumping-off point for
the Court's writing on incitement and the First Amendment for the rest of the
century, expressly rests on a calculation of the risk of harm flowing from a
speech act:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When
a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by
1 60
any constitutional right.
Although it has remained unclear how far Holmes' clear and present danger
test was intended to stray from the prevailing "bad tendency" approach to
speech cases, 161 it is at least clear from the risk-analysis perspective that by
framing the question as he did-as one of "proximity and degree," of whether
the factual context in which words are spoken and the nature of the speech is
sufficient to create a "clear and present danger"-Holmes expressly required the
decision maker to go beyond a general finding that the subject speech might tend
to a bad result, to a specific evaluation of the risk that this speech would lead to a
162
bad result, in the context in which it occurred. Holmes himself acknowledged
that his formulation stemmed from his writing on the law of criminal attempt in
his famous work The Common Law, in which he had written: "The reason for
punishing any act must generally be to prevent some harm which is foreseen as
likely to follow that act under the circumstances in which it is done." An act that
is harmless in some circumstances will ground punishment in others "because it
raises a probability that it will be followed by such other acts and events as will
all together result in harm."' 163 Thus, "[jiust as a criminal attempt must come
sufficiently near completion to be of public concern, so there must be an actual
danger that speech will bring about an unlawful act before it can be
159. Id. at 52.
160. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
161. See, e.g., RABBAN, supra note 144, at 248-49, 256-57 (noting that Holmes used "clear and
present danger" as an expression of bad tendency and not to establish more protective standard);
Cover, supra note 143. at 372 (arguing that clear and present danger test was "born ...as an apology
for repression").
162. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF
430 (1993) (discussing letter to Zechariah Chafee that acknowledged that clear and present danger test
merely intended to encapsulate law of attempt); see also Yosal Rogat, The Judge As Spectator, 31 U.
CHI.L. REV. 213, 215 (1964) (noting that clear and present danger test was similar to Holmes' analysis
regarding attempts, which required specific intent).
163. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 67-68 (1881).
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restrained."1 64
In short, in Schenck Holmes started the First Amendment, at least in the
field of advocacy of unlawful action, on its long journey toward conformity with
the concerns of behavioral analysis. He did so in two ways. First, Holmes made
explicit that courts and juries venturing into this area were to be engaged in a
task of analyzing the risk level of speech. Second, he made the beginnings of an
effort to correct for the predictable flaws of risk analysis under conditions in
which the decision maker is likely to suffer from decision-making biases, or to
apply decision-making heuristics in instances in which those heuristics are
unlikely to lead to an accurate assessment of risk. That correction consisted of
an effort to provide a metric against which the risk was to be evaluated, in which
both the "proximity" and the "degree" of the risk were relevant factors to be
brought to the jury's attention. That metric was still too vague, and left far too
much scope for judges and juries to engage in a risk analysis guided more by
their passions than by a clear-eyed balancing of probabilities: Nevertheless, it
represented a significant improvement, or at least a potential improvement, over
the lesser "bad tendency" requirement. 65
If this was a salutary first step along that road, it was nevertheless
immediately apparent that the clear and present danger test either was not
consciously intended to guard against the risk of flawed risk analysis, or was an
ineffective safeguard. That it was ineffective on its face to guard against
overinflated estimations of the risk of speech became evident in the companion
cases handed down with Schenck.
In Frohwerk, the Court, again speaking through Justice Holmes, upheld a
conviction on charges involving the publication of a series of articles in a
German-language newspaper in Missouri criticizing the American war effort and
praising Germany. Although neither the vigor of the writing nor the context in
which the speech was published arguably posed as great a threat of resultant
draft resistance as in Schenck, 166 the Court refused to draw such a distinction.
The Court concluded that, on the record at least, "it is impossible to say that it
might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters
where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame [and that that] fact was
known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out." 167 Thus, Frohwerk
again highlights one of the twin themes struck repeatedly by a behavioral
analysis of the First Amendment caselaw-the question of who decides. At this

164. Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of
UnlawfulAction?, 1994 Sup. CT.REV. 209,217.
165. See Frederick M. Lawrence, The Collision of Rights in Violence-Conducive Speech, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1333, 1344 (1998) ("[A]lthough a 'clear and present danger' test improves upon a
'proximity and degree' or 'bad tendency' test, the clarity and presence of the danger remains largely if
not totally in the eye of the beholder.").
166. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM

OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 71-72 (1991) (noting that case against Frohwerk was weaker than case
against Schenck based on both intensity of the writing and recipients of the writing and that prosecutor
admitted Frohwerk was a "political prisoner").
167. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209.
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early point, at least, the Court was still unwilling to commandeer the role of risk
analyst, assuming instead that the task was no less within the jury's competence
than any other question it might be called on to decide.
Similarly, in Debs, in which the Court upheld the conviction of a major
public figure and perennial fringe presidential candidate for fairly commonplace
Socialist political speech, 168 the clear and present danger test did not figure at all,
with Holmes referring instead to the jury's use of the prevalent bad tendency
test. 169 Significantly for the question of the institutional assignment of risk
analysis that is central to this Article, Holmes indicated in private
correspondence that he might have voted differently had he been seated on the
jury, but he was unwilling to disturb their verdict. 170 Thus, although the clear
and present danger test sounded a more speech-protective note than a mere
"bad tendency" test, it was, at the very least, ineffective in realizing the hopes
171
civil libertarians entertained for it.
By giving full rein to the combined risk
determination of the legislature and the jury at a time of overwhelming public
concern, Holmes' test left little room for meaningful First Amendment
protection of provocative speech. Tellingly, the test created precisely the sort of
circumstances in which the availability heuristic, or Sunstein's "probability
neglect," would have caused juries to overestimate the risk of speech in
connection with the vivid examples of the ongoing war and the Russian
Revolution. In short, as Zechariah Chafee noted in his seminal early treatise on
the First Amendment, in such circumstances "the human machinery broke down
at a second point-the jury.'

172

168. See, e.g., Debs, 249 U.S. at 214 (characterizing much of the speech for which Debs was in
part convicted as "the usual contrasts between capitalists and laboring men, sneers at the advice to
cultivate war gardens, attribution to plutocrats of the high price of coal..."). Justice Holmes did note
that this portion of the speech had only an indirect bearing on the charge. Id.
169. See id. at 216 (noting that for jury to return guilty verdict, jury instructions required both
"natural tendency and reasonably probable effect" of words and "specific intent" of defendant to be
obstruction of the draft).
170. See RABBAN, supra note 144, at 295 (noting Holmes' conflicting statements in his
correspondence concerning his view of verdict in Debs).
171. Cf.Harry Kalven, Jr., Ernst Freud and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
235, 236-38 (1973) (arguing that Schenk and Debs must be read together as basis of First Amendment
law, especially because of questions raised by Debs as to what "clear and present danger" means).
172. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1942). As an example
of this systematic failure, Chafee presented the observations of a judge who tried numerous Espionage
Act cases:
For the first six months after June 15, 1917, I tried war cases before jurymen who were
candid, sober, intelligent business men, whom I had known for thirty years and who under
ordinary circumstances would have had the highest respect for my declarations of law, but
during that period they looked back into my eyes with the savagery of wild animals, saying
by their manner, "Away with this twiddling, let us get at him."
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B. Abrams, Gitlow, and Whitney: The Shifting Definition of the Clearand
Present Danger Test
Whatever was intended by Holmes' original statement of the clear and
present danger test, a sea change in its meaning began to form-albeit in
dissent-in another Espionage Act case. 173 In Abrams v. United States, 174 the
defendants set out to protest the United States' actions in sending a contingent
of marines to Vladivostock and Murmansk in the summer of 1918, in the wake of
the Russian Revolution, after the Bolsheviks had signed a peace treaty with
Germany. 75 They distributed several thousand leaflets, both by hand and by
throwing them out a window. The Court rejected the argument that "the only
intent of these defendants was to prevent injury to the Russian cause," 176 and
thus only indirectly to obstruct the war effort. It concluded that "the plan of
action which they adopted necessarily involved, before it could be realized,
defeat of the war program of the United States ....
,,177
Thus, the Court rejected
any argument that speech whose effect would only be indirect would not fall
within the clear and present danger test-a test, moreover, that went
78
unmentioned in the Court's opinion.
In one of his most famous opinions, Holmes (joined by Justice Brandeis)
dissented.1 79 Speaking to the statute itself, Holmes rejected the holding that the
evidence demonstrated sufficient intent to violate the Act, because the result
180
criminalized by the statute was not "the proximate motive of the specific act"
But this was only a prelude to his more significant remarks, on the First
Amendment implications of the case. 18' Holmes reasserted his belief that the
Court had decided correctly in Schenck and Debs,18 2 but in so doing reworded
the test significantly:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would
justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to
produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith
certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may
seek to prevent. The power undoubtedly is greater in time of war than
in time of peace because war opens dangers that do not exist at other

173. For a discussion of this "metamorphosis," see David S. Bogen, The Free Speech
Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, passim (1982).

174. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
175. For a general history of the Abrams case, see RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS:
THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987).

176. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that showing obstruction to be indirect effect
of speech was not enough).
179. Id. at 625-31.
180. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
181. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627-31 (Homes, J., dissenting) (discussing specific First Amendment
implications of this case).
182. Id.
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times.
But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the
principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the
present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that
to the expression of opinion where
warrants Congress in setting a limit
18 3
private rights are not concerned.
In his famous exposition of his views on free speech, Holmes continued by
arguing that given the ineffectual nature of the speech, the punishment seemed
aimed at the defendants' beliefs rather than their deeds. 84 Although he
recognized the logic inherent in restricting speech, he argued that the
"experiment" of the Constitution was meant to leave open a "free trade in
ideas." 85 Although this section of the opinion has been the subject of most of
the scholarship examining Holmes' dissent in Abrams, we may pass over it lightly
here, and rejoin his opinion at the point at which this principle is instantiated in
practical form:
While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country.... Only the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants
"Congress shall
making any exception to the sweeping command,
86
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.'
Whatever the original meaning of "clear" and "present" had been,
Holmes's dissent in Abrams made clear that the test should significantly narrow
the scope of speech that could be lawfully restricted.18 7 Where a jury might be
tempted to discern a significant risk of harm in generalized protest speech,
Holmes's reworked version of the test blunted this danger by pinning it to the
requirement that the fact-finder conclude that the risk of harm caused by the
speech was highly imminent. 8 8 While this test was, in a sense, more contentintrusive, because it required the jury to consider whether the speech in its
context was merely "silly," as Holmes dubbed the protest leaflets in Abrams, 189 it
nonetheless improved the test by making it less likely that a jury could fall sway
to cognitive illusions and conclude that too wide a range of speech constituted a
"clear and present" danger.

183. Id. 250 U.S. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
184. See id. at 628 (describing leaflet as "silly" and suggesting it was unlikely that it would be

effective in carrying out intent alleged by majority).
185. Id. at 630.
186. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
187. See id. at 629 (arguing against inclusion of indirect, unintended, and undesired effects in

range of restrictable speech).
188. See id. at 628 (noting that ineffectiveness of speech in achieving alleged intent may exclude
such speech from category subject to restriction under "clear and present danger" analysis).

189. Id.
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This was still not enough for some of Holmes' contemporary critics. In
particular, Learned Hand fastened on the fact that it still gave some fact-findera judge if not a jury-the responsibility of conducting the risk analysis inherent
in the clear and present danger test, at precisely those moments when individuals
are likely to overestimate the risks of speech:
I am not wholly in love with Holmesey's test. Once you admit that the
matter is one of degree... you give to Tomdickandharry, D.J., so
much latitude that the jig is at once up. Besides [the] Nine Elder
Statesmen have not shown themselves wholly immune from the "herd
instinct" and what seems "immediate and direct" to-day may seem very
remote next year even though the circumstances surrounding the
utterance be unchanged. I own I should prefer a qualitative formula,
hard, conventional, difficult to evade. 190
This criticism has bite. Although the reworked clear and present danger
test marked at least a significant attempt to cabin the fact-finder's risk analysis of
inciteful speech by expressly requiring a risk of truly imminent harm, 19' it still
left significant discretion to both juries and judges. It failed, in other words, to
expressly address the fundamental question of who conducts risk analysis. Still,
by independently reviewing the speech in question under the First Amendment,
Holmes took an important step away from his earlier opinions by implicitly
rejecting the view that Congress alone could make the determination of risk.
This debate would soon be engaged more explicitly by later courts.
The steps taken in Abrams were followed by two later opinions arising out
of criminal prosecutions in the wake of the so-called "Red Scare." In Gitlow v.
New York, 192 the Court considered the appeal of a conviction for violation of a
state law prohibiting advocacy of criminal conduct. Significantly, unlike the
Espionage Act, the state provision at issue in Gitlow did not address speech
"involving the danger of substantive evil,"' 193 but proscribed any speech
advocating criminal anarchy, effective or not. Indeed, the Court noted that
"[t]here was no evidence [of a harmful effect] resulting from the publication and
circulation of the Manifesto" at issue here. 194 The Court rested its affirmance on
the view that the legislature should be accorded substantial deference. 95 The
Court opined:
[T]he immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because
190. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 770 (1975) (quoting letter from Learned Hand to

Zechariah Chafee).
191. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 165, at 1347 ("The evaluation of harm is made more
objective when it looks to specific instances of imminent harm rather than to those that are general
instances of potential long-range harm.").
192. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
193. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 656.
195. See id. at 668 (noting legislature's determination that advocacy of criminal anarchy involved
substantive evil "must be given great weight"); see also Robert Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 1, 33 (1971) (agreeing with Gitlow majority that legislature
should be accorded deference where subject matter of speech "implicat[es] the safety of the nation").
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the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The
State cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every
such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A single
revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may
burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration.' 96
As long as the legislature concluded that certain utterances "involve[d] such
danger of substantive evil that they may be punished," the question whether
197
there was any real risk of danger was not open to the Court's consideration.
The Court contrasted statutes of this kind from the Espionage Act; while it
reaffirmed the language of clear and present danger employed by Holmes in
Schenck-but not the revised version of his Abrams dissent-it held that the test
was only applicable in statutes where the legislature took upon itself the risk
98
determination. 1
Holmes and Brandeis dissented again. 199 Holmes refused to defer to the
legislature's judgment, insisting instead that in every case involving First
200
Amendment concerns, the court must apply the clear and present danger test.
201
The mere fact that the speech could
Here, he concluded, the test was not met.
be called an incitement was not enough. "Every idea is an incitement.... The
only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the
narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set
fire to reason." 20 2 But to be properly subject to criminal penalties, the speech
had to have some "chance of starting a present conflagration."' 20 3 If the
publication of the speech at issue had "been laid as an attempt to induce an
uprising against government at once," the court could at least have had a basis to
consider whether it "was not futile and too remote from possible
consequences." 204 But because there was no such charge here, no conviction
could be sustained. Thus, the Gitlow dissent began to engage both aspects of the
clear and present danger test that are of concern to behavioral analysis-how
restrictive the risk analysis must be, and who must perform the analysis.
Whitney v. California20 5 revisited the debate over both what test should be
applied and who should apply it. Anita Whitney was charged with violating
California's Criminal Syndicate Act for advocating criminal syndicalism. 2°6 The
Court reaffirmed its holding in Gitlow that the legislature should be accorded
wide latitude to class speech as dangerous. 207 Justice Brandeis (joined by
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669.
Id.
at 670.
Id.
at 671.
Id. at 672-73 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
Id..
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 673.
Id. (emphasis added).

204. Id. (emphasis added).

205. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
206. Whitney, 274 U.S. at360.
207. Id.
at 371.

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Holmes) concurred, but on substantially different terms. 208 Brandeis again
stressed that the legislature could not fix by statute the determination whether
speech was sufficiently dangerous to justify restriction. 2 9 He then revisited the
clear and present danger test, noting,
This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when
a danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet
be deemed present; and what degree of evil shall be deemed
sufficiently substantial to justify resort to abridgment of free speech
210
and assembly as the means of protection.
Brandeis concluded that incitement may not be punished "where the
advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on. ' 211 Thus, "[i]n order to support a
finding of clear and present danger, it must be shown either that immediate
serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct
212
furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.
Moreover, not only must the danger be imminent, but "the evil
apprehended (must be] relatively serious. '213 The speech must create "the
probability of serious injury to the State. '214 Thus, despite the language
suggesting that intent alone might suffice to ground a conviction, Brandeis's
Whitney concurrence again ratcheted up the clear and present danger test,
further restricting both the legislature's ability to conduct risk analysis without
independent judicial review and the fact-finder's own risk analysis role.
C. Dennis: Clearand Present Dangerin Retrogression
If the thesis of this Article is correct, this movement toward a more
restrictive test for speech constituting illegal advocacy can usefully be viewed as
an example of the development of free speech doctrine in a manner that,
consciously or not, recognized the risk that highly emotional times of political
emergency are likely to evoke the kinds of cognitive illusions that lead people to
overestimate perceived risks. Thus, the clear and present danger test moved
ever closer to a version that demanded that fact-finders conduct a heightened
evaluation deliberately focused on the true danger and imminence of the speech
subject to potential prosecution. Furthermore, it gradually moved away from a
posture of deference to either legislatures or juries, as Holmes and Brandeis
increasingly asserted an independent duty of judicial review as a backstop for the
potentially flawed determinations of other institutional actors within the legal

208. See id. at 372-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (distinguishing between legislative and judicial
roles in restricting speech). For an analysis of other aspects of Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
Whitney, see Horwitz, supra note 21, at 465-72.
209. Whitney. 274 U.S. at 373-74 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
210. td. at 374.
211. Id. at 376.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 377.
214. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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system. And this evolution is arguably evident in the fact that in a number of
post-Whitney cases in the first half of the century, the Court did in fact overturn
similar convictions. 215 But at this point, one could reasonably interject that even
if the development of clear and present danger doctrine did represent the kind of
evolution consistent with behavioral analysis described here, no test could
withstand the kinds of cognitive illusions described above. The very fact that the
test ultimately reposes with judges, who are equally subject to the distorting
effects of the availability heuristic, means it would prove no more than a paper
tiger when faced with a highly salient, vivid risk.
That objection was at least temporarily borne out when the Court faced its
next test. In the early days of the Cold War, a host of troubling events formed
the crucible in which the Court's next major clear and present danger decision
was decided: the Soviet Union had detonated its first nuclear weapon, the
United States had become embroiled in the Korean War, and concern-arguably
justifiable, in light of contemporary knowledge-had arisen about Communist
espionage within the United States. Against this backdrop, the Court was faced
with an appeal by the leaders of the American Communist Party of their
convictions for criminal conspiracy. In Dennis v. United States,216 the Court
upheld the conviction and failed the test.
A plurality of the Court finally accepted the Holmes/Brandeis view of the
21 7
clear and present danger test, but in so doing it gave the test a fatal reworking.
The Court distinguished the perceived dangers faced by the Gitlow-era Court,
though they likely seemed real enough at the time, arguing that they "were not
confronted with any situation comparable to the instant one-the development
of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the Government, in
the context of world crisis after crisis." 218 It eviscerated the imminence
requirement, which served as such a potent restraint on faulty risk analysis,
holding that "success or probability of success is [not] the criterion" for
conviction. 21 9 Instead, and ironically, the plurality opinion accepted the
formulation of the test adopted by Learned Hand, one of the early critics of the
clear and present danger test, for the Second Circuit below: "In each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger."

220

215. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (reversing conviction under statute outlawing
assisting in the conduct of a meeting sponsored by an organization which advocates illegal means of
achieving political change); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (reversing conviction under state law
prohibiting advocacy of criminal syndicalism).
216. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
217. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 190-91 (1988) ("[Dennis] acknowledges
clear and present danger as the constitutional measure of free speech, but in the process, to meet the
political exigencies of the case, it officially adjusts the test, giving it the kiss of death.").
218. Dennis. 341 U.S. at 510.

219. Id.
220. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). affd, 341 U.S.
494 (1951)).
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Thus, the Court's reworked test took the bite out of the clear and present
danger test. It removed the key elements of the test - a requirement of both
gravity and immediacy-that made it a dike against the flood of popular
sentiment. In their place, it substituted a sliding scale in which any emergency
likely to evoke an overestimation of risk would sweep aside any factual
requirements that could force the risk determination back to the facts at hand.
The Dennis Court did take one positive step: it concluded that the first-order
determination whether the speech at issue creates a clear and present danger is a
question of law to be determined by the Courts, not impassioned juries. 22' But
this step away from legislative deference hardly compensated for the retrograde
effect of the Court's reworking of the test itself.
All the issues raised by this Article were aired by the Court in Dennis.
Concurring, Justice Frankfurter went still further than Chief Justice Vinson's
opinion, suggesting that the Court should simply apply "a straightforward
balance between the costs and benefits of suppressing the communication,
without the pretense of a mathematical formula." 222 But he questioned the
assignment of the decision-making role to the courts at all, writing, "To make
validity of legislation depend on judicial reading of events still in the womb of
time-a forecast, that is, of the outcome of forces at best appreciated only with
knowledge of the topmost secrets of nations-is to charge the judiciary with
duties beyond its equipment. '223 That assessment ignored the problem raised
above: that legislative determinations in times of national emergency are likely
to be driven by popular passions as much as by closely held state secrets. 224 Nor
did Justice Frankfurter ask why the legislature's judgment could have deserved
deference with respect to the speech at issue, when the Smith Act, under which
the defendants were convicted, had been passed in 1940-well before the events
225
leading to the prosecution.
Also concurring, Justice Jackson fastened on the clear and present danger
test itself, scoffing at the notion that it could possibly protect "Communist

221. See id. at 513 (providing that clear and present danger doctrine is judicial rule to give effect
to Constitutional Amendment protections).
222. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 108 (1980).

Justice Frankfurter discussed

the purpose of the First Amendment balancing test as follows:
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national
security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests,
within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the
non-Euclidian problems to be solved.
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
223. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 551 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
224. See supra text accompanying note 120 for support of proposition that legislators suffer from
same cognitive illusions that afflict non-decision makers. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING
DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 21 (2001) (noting that legal policy in democratic
governments is driven by "social cascade" effects); Posner, supra note 112, at 696 ("(]n a democracy
the public is in the saddle. When the public is terrified, elected officials gallop").
225. Hans Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970).
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plotting.., during its period of incubation."' 226 If imminence were made a
requirement, the government could only act when it would be too late.22 7 Again,
whatever the wisdom of this argument might be if we could assume that
government is capable of sound, rational evaluation of risk, Jackson misses the
danger posed by such a test if, as behavioral analysis suggests, institutional actors
are likely to fall prey to cognitive illusions leading them to overestimate risk.
By contrast, Justice Douglas's dissent recognized this danger, arguing that
"[tihe restraint to be constitutional must be based on more than fear .... There
'228
must be some immediate injury to society that is likely if speech is allowed.
Yet Justice Douglas also protested the reassignment of the decisional role from
the jury to the courts 229-a curious stance, given the likelihood that juries, even
more than judges, would disregard whatever test was set before them.
230
In keeping with his absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment,
Justice Black also dissented. Black frontally assaulted the role of rationality in
First Amendment analysis, arguing that the First Amendment did not "permit[]
us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of
Congress' or our own notions of mere 'reasonableness.' 231 Given that Black's
formalist theory of constitutional interpretation rejected the application of
balancing methodology in the First Amendment altogether, it is unlikely he
would have supported an approach based on behavioral notions of rationality
any more than one based on cruder assumptions of classical rationality. But his
criticism of an approach based on reasonableness-that it would be unlikely "to
protect any but those 'safe' or orthodox views which rarely need its
protection" 23 2 -is perfectly consistent with the behavioral justification for setting
233
a high First Amendment bar to regulation of illegal advocacy.
Dennis thus offers a full airing of the twin themes of this Article-the
questions whether First Amendment jurisprudence must depart (and has
departed) from standard views of rationality in addressing speech regulation, and
to whom that decision should be committed. But it also raises the question
whether a strict test is in fact a sufficient guarantee against the departures from
careful risk analysis that are inevitable where vivid and salient risks elicit a
departure from that norm, and offers an illustration of the costs to free speech if

226. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 570 (Jackson, J., concurring).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 587.
230. See, e.g.. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865. 874 (1960) (providing an
example of Justice Black's strict interpretation of the language of the First Amendment).
231. Dennis,341 U.S. at 580 (Black, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. Curiously, Black also complained that the Dennis majority's new test "repudiate[s] directly
or indirectly the established 'clear and present danger' rule." d. While true, Black's remark gives no
indication that any such approach would have been inconsistent with his formalist and absolutist
approach to the First Amendment, as Justice Douglas would later argue in Brandenburg. See infra
note 250 and accompanying text for Justice Douglas's subsequent view that there is no room in the
First Amendment for any clear and present danger test.
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a strict test proves to be a parchment barrier. After three decades of
development away from a permissive to a restrictive interpretation of the clear
and present danger test, this supposed bulwark proved easy enough to overcome
2 34
in a perceived emergency.
Nevertheless, the apparent failure of the clear and present danger test as a
safeguard against poor risk analysis in Dennis should not overshadow the fact
that the test helped move the Court from its initial, unquestioning acceptance of
Congress's ability to regulate speech on the basis of bad tendencies in the
Schenck era to a heated debate over what level of emergency would be required
to permit such regulation, and over where the ultimate responsibility should lie.
Moreover, as the high-water mark of public concern over Communism and
espionage receded and it became apparent that domestic advocacy of
Communism was unlikely to amount to much, the Court may well have felt it
had been had. Dennis made it apparent that a sliding-scale approach to the risk
of illegal advocacy would lead the Court to uphold speech restrictions on the
assurances of public officials, such as Senator McCarthy, who would ultimately
become objects of public contempt, and with no real payoff, since the
"emergency" would prove evanescent. The Court would not be likely to lower
the bar again.
Dennis also offers further support for the view that a behavioral approach
to First Amendment problems involving the potential risks of speech offers real
bite that is not necessarily available under a standard model of rationality. For,
no matter how poorly regarded Dennis became, it was not an irrational decision.
To the contrary, its approach was fully in keeping with a standard economic
model of rationality. The Court's adoption of Learned Hand's probabilitycentered approach, which so closely resembled his celebrated economic formula
for negligence in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,235 was a perfectly rational
approach to "the probabilistic character of most types of harm caused by
speech. '236 And while Dennis may have come to represent a hysterical response
to Communist speech elicited by the hot passions of the Cold War, at the time
the concern with subversive speech was hardly irrational. 237 Without the benefit
of hindsight, Dennis's sliding-scale approach may have been quite rational. And
234. Cf Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The Brandenburg Test and Speech That Encourages or
Facilitates CriminalActs, 38 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) ("The willingness of society, and its

courts, to tolerate [advocacy of the commission of criminal acts] is likely to bear an inverse
relationship to the perceived likelihood that such advocacy will, in fact, lead to serious harm.").
235. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 141, at 65 n.9 (noting resemblance
between the two tests).
236. POSNER, supra note 141, at 64 (emphasis omitted). Posner discusses clear and present
danger in economic terms and argues, in that regard, that consistent with Dennis, it would be rational
to consider the magnitude of the potential harm quite apart from any considerations of imminence.
Id. at 64-65.
237. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 320 (1990) (stating that
while retrospectively it appears that Americans' fear of Communist Party U.S.A. was greatly
exaggerated, this was unclear in 1951); cf POSNER, supra note 141, at 72 (arguing that hindsight
fallacies arising from fact that "socialist agitation" of Schenck era amounted to little may have colored
free speech jurisprudence, although outcome could not then have been known).
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putting aside the fact that no harms in fact resulted from advocacy of domestic
communism, is it not a reasonable cost-benefit view that speech may be
restricted on the basis of the probability of the magnitude of harm irrespective of
2 38
imminence, if the level of harm justifies it?
A behavioral approach manages to dissolve this conflict between hindsight
and foresight. Yes, Dennis's approach may have been reasonable on the basis of
the available information; so it is unfair to hold it up as an example of hysterical
overreaction simply because one has the benefit of hindsight. But even ex ante,
the methodology applied by a decision maker under conditions of uncertainty
should be able to account for the predictable presence of cognitive illusions. The
Court erred by watering down the clear and present danger test in Dennis not
because it was wrong to be concerned about the subversive effects of
Communism and the risks of espionage, a view that came to be the received
wisdom in the post-McCarthy period, but because it failed to understand that
even if its fears were not misplaced, they would be predictably overstated.
Thus, merely to criticize Dennis for seeing a risk where none materialized,
without attending to the cognitive illusions that were likely to contribute to that
mistake, is worse than unfair; it is an invitation to hubris. Ultimately, in an
important sense, the problem with Dennis is not that the Court did not act
rationally, although we may so conclude with the benefit of hindsight, but that it
did act rationally. Or, more precisely, Dennis represented a misstep in the
development of the law because, in crafting a test of this sort, the Court should
have had in mind from the beginning the kind of predictable departures from
sound risk and probability analysis that would be likely to erupt if judges
attempted to apply a purely probabilistic test, untethered to any stricter
requirements of immediacy, in times of perceived emergency. Dennis thus
teaches us that any non-absolutist approach will be insufficiently protective if it
does not assume up front the certainty that a "rational" approach will
predictably and ineluctably lead to decisional errors, and if it does not attend
carefully to the question of who conducts the analysis.
D. Raising the Barrierto Cognitive Illusions: Toward Brandenburg and Its
Progeny
That the Supreme Court appeared to have learned its lesson from the
denouement of McCarthyism and the postwar Red Scare became evident in the
years following Dennis. Although the Court upheld various attempts to restrict
39
communist activities, particularly those aimed at government employees,

238. See ELY, supra note 222, at 108 for an example of such reasoning.
239. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 114-15 (1961)
(upholding requirement that "Communist-action organizations" register with Attorney General and
disclose information about its members and activities); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 12634 (1959) (upholding contempt citation for witness who refused to answer questions about his past and
present membership in Communist Party before congressional investigating committee): Am.
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382. 390-99 (1950) (upholding labor legislation prohibiting
enforcement of representation rights of labor unions whose officials did not swear by affidavit that
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cracks began to appear in the facade. 240 Most of these cases did not grapple with
the risk analysis aspects of the clear and present danger test. In Yates v. United
States,24 ' however, the Court began to chip away at the approach it had taken in
Dennis. In Yates, the Court overturned the convictions of several Communist
Party members for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act. Although that statute's
constitutionality had already been upheld in Dennis, in order to void the
convictions here the Court employed the doctrine that statutes should be
interpreted to avoid constitutional doubts. Justice Harlan concluded that the
statute did not reach mere "doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow," as
opposed to the conduct attacked in Dennis, which he characterized as involving
"indoctrination of a group in preparation for future violent action, as well as
exhortation to immediate action. ' 242 In drawing the distinction, Justice Harlan
effectively revived Justice Brandeis's focus on imminence: "That sort of
advocacy [simple 'doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow'], even though
uttered with the hope that it may ultimately lead to violent revolution, is too
remote from concrete action to be regarded as the kind of indoctrination
preparatory to action which was condemned in Dennis. '243 Justice Harlan also
made clear that actual proscribable instances of "advocacy of action are so few
and far between as to be almost completely overshadowed by the hundreds of
instances" in which the speech was "so remote from action as to be almost
wholly lacking in probative action."' 244 By requiring a close link between
advocacy and action,2 45 Yates thus moved back from Dennis's attempt to
eliminate imminence from the clear and present danger test. As Gerald Gunther
has observed, "Harlan claimed to be interpreting Dennis. In fact, [Yates]
' ' 246
represented doctrinal evolution in a new direction.

they were not members of the Communist Party). For the story of the Warren Court's mixed record in
the Cold War era, see LUCAS A. POWE. JR.. THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 75-103,
135-56 (2000).
240. See, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1963)
(invalidating contempt citation for witness who refused to answer questions before state investigating
committee about whether certain members of the Communist Party were also members of the
NAACP). Race was an important factor in the Supreme Court's changing approach to First
Amendment problems in the domestic security context. See, e.g.. POWE. supra note 239, at 498 ("[ln
protecting the NAACP, the Court adopted methods that would shortly thereafter dismantle the
outmoded domestic-security programs."). Indeed, the argument that concern over the geopolitical
effect of international awareness of the United States' treatment of the race issue, particularly in
strategically vital Third World countries, contributed to the liberal outcomes of the Warren Court
suggests that the retreat from the speech-restrictive approach of cases such as Dennis was itself a Cold
War strategy. E.g., Mary Dudziak. Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative. 41 STAN. L. REV. 61. 89111 (1988).
241. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
242. Yates, 354 U.S. at 321.
243. Id. at 321-22.
244. Id. at 327.
245. See Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 720 n.279
(interpreting Justice Harlan's opinion as requiring link between advocacy and action in the sense of
being instructed to perform specific actions or being positively directed by speaker).
246. Gunther, supra note 190, at 753. Gunther argues that Yates represents a turn to Learned
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In Brandenburg v. Ohio,247 the Court not only came full circle from the
Dennis approach to clear and present danger, but took the test still further.
Here, the Court was not dealing with the same sort of political speech implicated
in its earlier decisions; instead, this speech arose in the context of racial conflict.
Brandenburg, an official in a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under Ohio's
criminal syndicalism statute for his remarks at a Klan rally. Those remarks,
while threatening in tone, did not really suggest the likelihood of imminent
violence. 248 The Court noted that a similar statute's constitutionality had been
upheld by the majority of the Court in Whitney, but concluded that "Whitney has
been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. '249 The Court thus agreed with
Dennis that the clear and present danger test was to be the operative test in
illegal advocacy cases. 250 But its restatement signaled yet another sea change in
the meaning of the test:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
1
such action.

25

Brandenburg thus institutionalized a new version of the clear and present
danger test carrying the following requirements: (1) the implicated speech must
be aimed at inciting or producing (2) imminent lawless action, and (3) must be
likely to incite or produce the lawless activity. This test marks a new and-so
far-lasting high-water mark. 252 As scholars have observed, Brandenburg
reached to Learned Hand's Masses test to limit proscribable speech to words
actually inciting lawless action,25 3 and combined them with the most protective

Hand's approach in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), which focused on
whether the implicated speech was incitement rather than on whether the speech risked a particular
outcome. Whether this is correct or not, that element would certainly resurface in Brandenburg. See
infra note 253 and accompanying text.
247. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
248. See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446 (quoting defendant's speech in film of Ku Klux Klan
rally, as reproduced in record: "We're not a revengent organization, but if our President, our
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengence taken.").
249. Id. at 447 (citing Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507).
250. That fact was sufficient to provoke Justices Black and Douglas to limit their agreement with
the Court to a pair of concurring opinions, agreeing with the result but arguing that, there should be
"no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any 'clear and present danger' test, whether strict
and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling as the Court in Dennis rephrased it." Id. at 454
(Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring) (agreeing that clear and present
danger doctrine should have no place in First Amendment).
251. Id. at 447.
252. See Anthony Lewis, Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against Democracy (noting
profound change since Debs, and suggesting that "[i]t is unthinkable now that anyone would be sent to
prison for speaking critically of official policy, whether or not in wartime"), in FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND INCITEMENr AGAINST DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (Francine Kershman Hazan & David Kretzmer eds.,

2000).
253. See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (distinguishing between
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elements of the Abrams and Whitney interpretations of the clear and present
danger test, to produce "the most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the
254
Supreme Court.
By taking such a protective approach, Brandenburg can be read as the
culmination of an evolution of this area of First Amendment jurisprudence
toward a test that serves a prophylactic function with regard to standard and
predictable cognitive illusions that are likely to distort the factfinder's analysis of
the risk of illegal advocacy.2 55 The early versions of the test began the process by
focusing on the risk-analysis aspects of free speech jurisprudence. But by
allowing the factfinder to perform a more or less uncabined risk analysis, they
did not serve to preclude convictions in the face of impassioned juries examining
speech that elicited cognitive illusions such as the availability heuristic or
probability neglect. Abrams and Whitney tightened the test by focusing on
imminence, thus further cabining the factfinder's role; but as Dennis
demonstrated, even that test was not enough to stave off distorted perceptions of
risk. Yates refocused on imminence, and began the task of insuring against the
future recrudescence of a Dennis-like test by drawing a narrow boundary around
the kinds of speech that would be subject to a risk-analyzing balancing test at all.
Finally, Brandenburg raised the bar against cognitive illusions still higher by
combining the two elements to provide a strict test that looks to both the nature
of the speech and the likelihood that any harm that results will be both imminent
2 56
and closely related to the speech.
That solution has, so far, turned out to be a lasting one, not subject to the
backsliding witnessed in Dennis.257 To be sure, the passionate, if distorted, view
of potential risks resulting from speech that arises in moments like the current
one may yet prove stronger than any judicial formulation. 258 But if this Article's

words as "triggers of action" rather than "keys of persuasion" in setting boundaries of unprotected

speech).
254. Gunther, supra note 190, at 755.
255. Cf Darren Bush, The "Marketplace of Ideas:" Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote's
Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1129 (2000) (discussing how Supreme Court First Amendment
cases are inconsistent with economic theory and market-based ideology because they "assume that the
audience suffers from high informational barriers and is irrational (i.e., unable to calculate the actual

net marginal benefit of revolution)").
256. Cf Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 453-56 (1985) (arguing that one purpose of strict First Amendment tests is to craft rules,
especially in times of relative peace, that serve as a hard bulwark against speech-repressive tendencies
at times of great stress and urgency, when courts would otherwise be unlikely to protect it).
257. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-09 (1973) (reversing conviction for disorderly
conduct of individual who shouted, "We'll take the fucking street later," on grounds that words were
not intended or likely to produce imminent disorder).

258. This is the fear voiced by Justice Douglas, who in his concurrence in Brandenburg
observed-correctly, as we have seen-that the test's history "aroused" "great misgivings" by
revealing that it would not prevent impassioned fact finders, including "judges so wedded to the status
quo that critical analysis ma[kes] them nervous," from permitting conviction in inappropriate cases.
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 454 (Douglas, J., concurring). For a prediction that is chilling in the present
circumstances, but as yet unwarranted, see Larry Alexander, Incitement and Freedom of Speech, in
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY, supra note 252, 101,118. Alexander
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thesis is correct, then it is less surprising that Brandenburg and its development
have helped disturb the long historical pattern of speech repression in times of
political emergency-a fact that, although it is rarely remarked on as such, is
259
both surprising and significant.
One objection that might be advanced to this picture is that any connection
between the development of the clear and present danger test and the cognitive
illusions described above, such as the availability heuristic, is fortuitous. The
clear and present danger test, this objection would run, does not directly address
itself to those concerns: while the imminence requirement tightens the finding
needed for a conviction, it still leaves a form of risk analysis in place. Thus, the
straitened risk analysis it prescribes could still be applied by a decision maker
subject to all of these cognitive shortcomings.
That intuitively attractive criticism is less well-placed than it may seem. By
focusing on imminence, the Brandenburg version of the test departs significantly
from the kind of straightforward probabilistic test that might be expected under
dominant theories of rationality. It is simply more difficult to conduct a
distorted analysis of risk when, by demanding imminence, the test will generally
require a jury to balance its passionate assessment of risk with the actual
260

outcome-which, as Justice Harlan noted in Yates, rarely involves violence.
Even where violence does result, the imminence requirement ties the speech so
closely, temporally speaking, to the result in time that a successful conviction will
be rare. 261 As Vincent Blasi observes, the imminence requirement has been

proved to be justifiable on pragmatic grounds:

predicts,
A wave of Oklahoma City-like bombings by militia groups could conceivably usher in a
new era of a Dennis-like constitutional test. Only a principle stronger than the
Brandenburg compromise could possibly prevent such a change. On the other hand, one
wonders whether any liberal principle, no matter how absolute and pure, could effectively
save civil liberties in such perilous times.
Id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive
Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 630-31 (2002) (arguing that "judges will introduce
their own cognitive biases into the evolution of public policy, whatever the ostensible standard of
review").
259. But see Rohr, supra note 234, at 3 (arguing that Brandenburg test has "ultimately proven, in
actual practice, to be far less protective of speech than its literal wording would have suggested").
260. See Lawrence, supra note 165, at 1347. Lawrence notes:
[W]herever consequentialist considerations enter into the free expression calculus, the court
must act with awareness of the high risks posed by subjective evaluations of harm. The
evaluation of harm is made more objective when it looks to specific instances of imminent
harm rather than to those that are general instances of potential long-range harm. This is
the direction taken by the "direct incitement" test. We may criticize Brandenburg for
maintaining a consequentialist focus.
Nonetheless, the Brandenburg Court's
consequentialism is superior to the Dennis Court's.
Id.
261. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (noting, in case
involving boycott of white-owned businesses in Mississippi, that while some violence ensued after
boycott leader's threat that "necks would be broken," such violence occurred at a sufficient removal in
time from speech that result did not fall within Brandenburg'sscope).
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"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." And
experience tells us that the power to punish speech will be abused, as
Holmes certainly believed it had been in Abrams, if all the prosecution
must show is a plausible scenario of eventual harm. Absent a
demanding causation rule such as an imminence test, a rule so
demanding that it permits a reviewing court to declare an asserted
causal connection downright 2implausible,
de facto convictions for
62
sedition are too likely to occur.
Moreover, to the extent that Justice Brandeis's formulation of the test in
Whitney is still present in any application of the test, the test further limits the
fact-finder to instances in which "the evil apprehended is relatively serious"'263
specifically, instances involving the threat of "serious injury to the State.
Thus, trivial violence will also fall outside the scope of the test.
Furthermore, that the test does not speak to the specific cognitive illusions
at issue, but instead rings them round with factual requirements that are difficult
to meet, in a sense may be viewed as beneficial from the standpoint of behavioral
analysis rather than as evidence of a deficiency. Cognitive biases are not easy to
counteract directly; thus, strategies are needed that cabin those tendencies, even
if they do not and cannot attack them frontally. Just as the courts have arguably
evolved indirect strategies to counteract the hindsight bias in the area of tort
liability, such as allowing a defense of compliance with ex ante norms and
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures, 264 so the evolution of the
clear and present danger test may be seen as the evolution of "second-best
strategies that are sensitive to the consequences of biased judgment[]" for the
265
First Amendment.
A second current that has run through this discussion has been the equally
important question of which institutional actor-legislators, jurors, judges, or
some combination-should be assigned responsibility for making the risk
262. Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1359 (quoting HOLMES, supra note 163, at 1).
263. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J. concurring)
264. See generally Rachlinski, supra note 15 (discussing judicial rules that take advantage of
specific opportunities to avoid bias).
265. See id. at 111-12. Rachlinski states:
Generic debiasing strategies are unlikely to be available, and the courts do not use them.
Instead they have developed mechanisms for taking advantage of specific circumstances that
allow them to reduce the influence of the hindsight bias. In those cases in which the bias
cannot be avoided, the courts have pursued sensible second-best strategies that are sensitive
to the consequences of biased judgments for both economics and justice.
Id.; see also Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the FirstAmendment: In Defense of

Clear and Present Danger,70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (1982). Redish analogizes to Churchill's famous
comment about democracy:
[Tlhe clear and present danger test is worst method for determining the degree of
constitutional protection of unlawful advocacy, except for all the other ways.... [W]hile
the clear and present danger test is unfortunately subject to potential abuse in its
application, no other suggested means of resolving the conflict inherent in regulating
unlawful advocacy does a better job.
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assessment, no matter how restricted that assessment may be by the formulation
of the legal rule. Although that controversy plays no part in Brandenburg, it
recurs throughout the earlier history in cases such as Gitlow, Whitney, and
Dennis. Because any of these actors may be subject to cognitive illusions in the
context of illegal advocacy, as the widespread and common reaction to
September 1l's events among elite and popular audiences alike suggests, there is
no ideal solution to this problem. But not all of these actors are necessarily
subject to the same degree of bias in each situation, and direct or indirect
debiasing strategies may be effective to different degrees when applied to each.
Over time, the courts' response to this problem has been an increasing
willingness to hold up both legislators' and juries' determinations to close
scrutiny.26 6 Compared to the early majorities' willingness to defer to the
legislature's initial risk determination that certain categories of speech were
dangerous, and their unwillingness to disturb the jury's evaluation once the
question had been put to them, the courts have increasingly performed the
analysis for themselves-not the only analysis, because often a first-order
determination will have been made by the legislature or jury, but a careful
second look 267 Learned Hand's objection to this solution-that judges, up to

and including the Supreme Court, "have not shown themselves wholly immune
from the 'herd instinct' and what seems 'immediate and direct' to-day may seem
very remote next year even though the circumstances surrounding the utterance
be unchanged" 268-is surely correct. Behavioral analysis confirms what we
already know: judges can be biased too.269 But the increasing "testness" of the
clear and present danger test, its evolution toward a formula in Brandenburgthat
contains increasingly concretized requirements that are less easily distorted by
cognitive illusions, bears a greater approximation to the test Hand hoped would
270
be adopted, one that is "qualitative.. . , conventional, difficult to evade.
Judges have experience applying such tests, and may be less likely to shake off
such fetters than a jury making that determination alone and given the usual
discretion that reviewing courts apply to jury verdicts. 2 71 That this institutional

266. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978) ("Deference
to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.").
267. This growing arrogation of judicial power to determine First Amendment issues, which
recurs throughout First Amendment law, is not without concerns of its own. For a discussion of some
such concerns, see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985)
and Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV. 761
(1986).
268. Gunther, supra note 190, at 770.
269. See, e.g., Guthrie, supra note 120, at 782-83 (discussing how empirical studies show that
professionals suffer cognitive illusions); Thaler, supra note 120, at 90 (concluding that experts are not
immune to cognitive illusions).
270. Gunther, supra note 190, at 770.
271. Cf W. Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, (arguing that judges "should be less prone to the
kinds of biases and risk-decision errors exhibited by the populace more generally"), in PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 186, 186-87 (Cass R. Sunstein et al., eds., 2002). Moreover, even if

lower courts fail in this duty, they are still subject to appellate review-and "[tihe Supreme Court has
made plain that it will not blindly accept a lower court's determination that speech is punishable
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role assignment need not, under behavioral analysis, point unfailingly to the
courts will become evident in the next section.
In sum, by tracing the history of the clear and present danger test through
the lens of behavioral analysis, we may be able to discern what is, in effect, a
response (conscious or unconscious) to the now-classic problems of cognitive
distortion in the area of risk analysis. That the law might evolve in accordance
with some value or other is not in itself surprising; that is, of course, the main
insight-though certainly not an uncontroversial one-of law and economics.
This analysis suggests that the rise of the modern clear and present danger test
may be fruitfully analyzed as an evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence to
272
account for and guard against the problems revealed by behavioral analysis.
This account helps explain why, although the legal and policy response to
September 11 has been so draconian in its potential incursion on certain civil
liberties, the First Amendment has been largely unmolested. Although the fears
and passions of the days following September 11 have naturally faded somewhat
in time, those passions were the guiding force of public opinion for weeks, if not
months. It is already difficult to recall just how certain another attack seemed,
and just how fragile conditions were perceived to be. Conditions were ripe for
prosecutors to charge that heated political speech could lay the tinder for a
future conflagration-and for willing juries to agree. 273 It was, and is, surely the
case that "[n]o terrorist attack has ever been as available to Americans as the
attacks of September 11."274

The Brandenburg test was made for just such a moment. As deep as the
attacks cut, the internalized constitutional culture of the First Amendment
arguably cut still deeper-not only for judges, but for legislators and citizens
too. 275

The concern expressed by Justice Brennan that the government "has

proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error" of curtailing civil

'incitement,' and not protected, albeit spirited, advocacy." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-10, at 849 n.58 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Claiborne Hardware,see supra
note 261).
272. See supra note 27 for Rachlinski's and Issacharoff's comments on the law's apparent
adaptations to cognitive illusions of judgment.
273. See, e.g., C.K. "Pete" Rowland, Psychological Perspectives on Juror Reactions to the
September 11 Attacks, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 180, 181 (2002) (predicting, in context of personal injury
cases rather than cases directly related to September 11, that jurors "will be significantly more prone
to punish defendants who they perceive as behaving with wanton disregard for safety than they would
have been before September 11"); Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1230 (2002) (noting "[tlhe familiarity of the targets and the blanket media
coverage of the attacks"): see also Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?,112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1039-41 (2003) (noting effects of cognitive shortcomings
such as availability heuristic in driving demand for extraordinary government actions in wake of
September 11 attacks).
274. Responding to Terrorism,supra note 273, at 1230.
275. See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1230 (arguing that changes in legal and social
culture led to "trend towards [greater] civil liberty protections during wartime" that is evident in
relatively reduced incursions on civil liberties evident in government's response to September 11).
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liberties "when the next crisis came along" thus seems overstated. 276 In this
instance, at least, the development and broad acceptance of a protective
approach to speech, one which raised high barriers against the cognitive
shortcomings that attend the popular passions of a moment of crisis, rendered
heightened speech regulation unacceptable at just the moment that no other
constitutional incursion seemed implausible. 277 In this area, at least, the law
became a safeguard against cognitive shortcomings rather than their servant. 278

IV. A DEPARTURE

FROM THE IMPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS:
COMMERCIAL SPEECH

Although behavioral analysis of the clear and present danger test serves to
confirm the wisdom of the evolution of that doctrine, the same result does not
obtain from a behavioral analysis of other areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence. In some doctrinal areas, behavioral analysis may suggest that the
courts' implicit acceptance of classical models of rationality has led it down
doctrinal paths that are not suitable to the real world of human decision-making.
One such area is the doctrine of commercial speech. As the following
discussion suggests, commercial speech jurisprudence has moved steadily toward
a speech-protective approach that has erased the distinction between commercial
speech and other categories of speech. Although, according to the prevailing
test, the government may regulate "misleading" speech, the Court has in recent
years receded from the sort of paternalistic view that permits much regulation
under this heading. That doctrinal movement is grounded on the belief that
consumers are as capable of rationally evaluating and responding to commercial
speech as they are to political or other categories of speech.
Behavioral analysis suggests otherwise. Consumers who read or watch
commercial speech are subject to pervasive cognitive illusions. Indeed, as this
section shows, over the same period of time in which the Court moved toward a
more speech-permissive view of commercial speech, propelled by the view that
consumers are capable of rationally analyzing advertising and other such speech,
the advertising industry has taken advantage of its own store of psychological
research into marketing and advertising to ensure that consumers will be
deprived of the fullest use of their powers of ratiocination. Moreover, some
high-risk products, such as tobacco, are highly addictive and thus still less likely
276. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudenceof Civil Liberties in Times

of Securities Crises, 18 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 11, 11 (1988).
277. This arguably confirms the wisdom of Vincent Blasi's recommendation. See Blasi, supra
note 256 at 454-56 (strict First Amendment rules created in peace-time will keep First Amendment
protections intact in times of crises).
278. See HIRSCH, supra note 140, at 77-78. Hirsch explains:
[Riecognition of the universality of bounded rationality suggests the possibility of extending
paternalism: Lawmakers may, where necessary, self-paternalize, protecting themselves from
their own perceived irrationality, just as they do for others... Lawmakers, creating
substantive rules to govern others and process rules to govern themselves, can [protect
themselves from their own irrationality].
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to permit "rational" consumer choice. Nor are informational strategies designed
to counter the effects of commercial speech an adequate response. While
current behavioral treatments of commercial speech have focused on how tort
liability might be altered to respond to the preference-distorting effects of
commercial speech involving such products, this section suggests that behavioral
analysis counsels a more speech-restrictive approach than the one toward which
279
the Court is moving.
A. The Development of Commercial Speech Doctrine
Commercial speech was initially entitled to no constitutional protection at
all.280 In Valentine v. Chrestensen,281 the Court held that the First Amendment
imposed no "restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising." 282 But in 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,283 the Court reversed its longstanding rule and held
that commercial speech was entitled to at least intermediate protection under the
First Amendment. 284
The speech at issue was a regulation restricting
285
pharmacists from distributing information about prescription drug prices.
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun argued that even "speech which does no
more than propose a commercial transaction" is not so removed from the
286
exposition of ideas as to fall outside the scope of the First Amendment.
Justice Blackmun advanced two constitutional values that justified
protecting commercial speech. 287 First, both individuals and society at large have
"a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information." 288 As he stated in
a subsequent case, "Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry
information of import to significant issues of the day." 289 Thus, protecting
commercial speech safeguards the essential role that "the free flow of

279. Law and economics itself does not necessarily disagree with this prescription. See, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 141, at 86 (arguing for limitations on free speech in advertising and defamation
cases where truth of speech cannot be identified through market competition). A behavioral analysis
approach offers its own perspective, however, focusing on consumer behavior rather than overall
market phenomena.
280. See MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY 14-62 (2001) (offering history of development of commercial speech doctrine and
arguing for more permissive approach to regulation of commercial speech).
281. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
282. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54; see also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1951)
(upholding restriction on door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions).
283. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
284. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.

285. Id. at 752.
286. Id. at 763, 772 n.24 (citation omitted).
287. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8
(2000) (discussing Blackmun's holding in Virginia State Boardof Pharmacy).
288. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 763-64.

289. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977).
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information" plays in a democratic society. 29° Second, commercial speech serves
to ensure "the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. '291
"'The efficient allocation of resources depends upon informed consumer
choices,' which in turn requires the free circulation of commercial
292
information."
The Court took a sternly anti-paternalistic approach, arguing that the
challenged law "rest[ed] in large measure on the advantages of [citizens'] being
kept in ignorance.2 93 In contrast to paternalism, it proposed a model based on a
model of the rational consumer, 294 suggesting that one may "assume that this
information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them. '295
Thus, from its inception, the Court's new commercial speech doctrine assumed
that the dangers of commercial speech would be significantly counterbalanced by
consumers' ability to make rational decisions if exposed to more commercial
speech. But the Court did enter a small caveat, suggesting that there should be
no constitutional problem with regulations that dealt with "deceptive or
misleading" commercial speech. 296
The modern test for commercial speech was set out by the Court in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.297 There, the Court
broke the test into two parts. If the speech in question is unlawful or misleading,
it is entitled to no special constitutional protection at all. 298 If it is lawful and
non-misleading, the Court applies a three-pronged test, asking: (1) whether the
government interest in regulation is "substantial"; (2) whether the regulation
"directly" advances the governmental interest; and (3) whether the regulation is
tailored to the government interest. 299 The regulation need only offer a
"reasonable" fit between the government's ends and its chosen means. 300 Thus,
the Central Hudson test is "essentially a watered-down version of the compelling
'30 1
interest test.

290. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
291. Id.
292. Post, supra note 287, at 8-9 (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)).
293. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769. But see Daniel Hays Lowenstein. "Too Much
Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1238 (1988) (arguing
that price advertising ban in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was not paternalistic).
294. See, e.g.. Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent": An Exploration of the Psychology of
Advertising, Addictions, and the Implicationsfor Commercial Speech, 25 SEATrLE U.L. REv. 377, 383

(2001) ("[T]he Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence reflects the assumption that the
rational consumer, as the Court conceives of 'rational.' is the norm.").
295. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy. 425 U.S. at 770.
296. Id. at 771.
297. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
298. Cent. Hudson. 447 U.S. at 566.
299. Id.
300. Bd. of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
301. FARBER, supra note 23, at 157.
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In recent years, a number of members of the Court have advocated
tightening the constitutional scrutiny of commercial speech, even where it deals
with high-risk products such as liquor and tobacco. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island,30 2 for example, the Court invalidated a state statute that
prohibited advertising the price of alcoholic beverages, save for price tags or
signs not visible from the street. The Court's plurality opinion agreed that the
state may "protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
practices," 30 3 but may not enact blanket bans on the dissemination of truthful
and non-misleading commercial speech. 3°4 Despite its acknowledgement that
the state had a substantial interest in promoting temperance, and that the
regulation might achieve that interest by artificially maintaining high prices by its
ban on price advertising, the Court rejected that speculative argument "when the
State takes aim at accurate commercial information for paternalistic ends. '30 5
Other cases have also displayed an increasingly speech-permissive approach to
commercial speech. 306 In short, while the Court has maintained the Central
Hudson test, its application of that test has been increasingly strict.
While he has not commanded a majority for his view, Justice Thomas has
been a forceful advocate for this permissive view of commercial speech. He has
argued that "all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them
ignorant are impermissible. ' '30 7 Calling to mind the debate in clear and present
danger doctrine over who should be entrusted with decision-making
responsibility, Justice Thomas criticized Central Hudson's "substantial
governmental interest" test, asserting that the requirement "apparently requires
judges to delineate those situations in which citizens cannot be trusted with
information, and invites judges to decide whether they themselves think that
consumption of a product is harmful enough that it should be discouraged. ' 308
The test, he suggested, "appl[ies] [the] contradictory premises" that "informed
adults are the best judges of their own interests, and that they are not. ' 30 9 In 44
Liquormart, he argued that "there is no philosophical or historical basis for
asserting that commercial speech is of lower value than non-commercial

302. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
303. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501.
304. Id.

305. Id. at 507.
306. See, e.g.. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (invalidating advertising
regulations governing outdoor advertising of tobacco and certain point-of-sale advertising within 1,000
feet of public playgrounds or elementary or secondary schools, while permitting regulations barring
use of self-service tobacco displays and requiring that tobacco products be placed out of consumers'
reach): Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 190-95 (1999)
(invalidating federal law prohibiting radio and television broadcasters from carrying advertisements
about privately operated commercial casino gambling); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,
488-89 (1995) (invalidating federal law prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol content on
grounds that overall regulatory scheme was irrational).
307. 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 526 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
308. Id. at 527-28.
309. Id.
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speech. '310 In Lorillard Tobacco, a recent case involving regulations on tobacco
advertising that purported to be aimed at preventing youth smoking, Justice
Thomas went further, stating "I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a
coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. '311 Thus,
any asserted government interest "in keeping people ignorant by suppressing
expression is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of commercial
'312
speech than it can justify regulation of non-commercial speech.
Thus, commercial speech doctrine has moved progressively from an
approach permissive of regulation to one that is increasingly restrictive. The
Court has advanced an autonomy-based view of commercial speech that holds
that individuals are perfectly capable of rationally receiving and evaluating
commercial information, and that nothing will prevent them from looking after
their own best interests. To be sure, the CentralHudson test allows regulation of
"misleading" speech. 313 But the Court's application of that restriction has, with
315
one exception, 314 remained in disuse.
B. Cognitive Illusions and Commercial Speech
Behavioral analysis calls into question the rationality assumption that has
driven the Court's recent commercial speech jurisprudence. In particular, it
offers a countering perspective to Justice Thomas's forceful advocacy of that
approach. In a series of articles dealing with the phenomenon of "market
manipulation," Professors Hanson and Kysar have presented voluminous
evidence of the effects of cognitive distortions on consumer preference, many of
316
them quite intentionally evoked by sophisticated marketing techniques.
310. Id. at 522.
311. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 575 (Thomas, J. concurring) (citation omitted).
312. Id. (citation omitted).
313. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 566.
314. See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 15 (upholding Texas statute prohibiting practice of optometry
under "any trade name" as permissible restriction of misleading advertising, since trade names could
be used to mislead public).
315. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. and Profl Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 144-49 (1994)
(rejecting claim that attorney's accurate description of herself as a certified public accountant is
inherently misleading): Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 10206 (1990) (rejecting argument that description of lawyers as "certified" or "specialists" in particular
fields was "inherently misleading"): Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-75 (rejecting claim that price advertising of
routine legal services was sufficiently "inherently misleading" to justify prohibition).
316. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to
Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 266-381 (2000) [hereinafter Hanson &

Kysar, Response] (analyzing debate regarding policy implications of market manipulation by tobacco
companies and responding to criticism of theory of imposing enterprise liability on such companies):
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market

Manipulation. 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1553-71 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Evidence]
(arguing for several features of enterprise liability to prevent market manipulation by tobacco
companies): Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously. The Problem of
Market Manipulation. 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 722-743 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar. Problem]

(identifying problem of market manipulation by manufacturers who. conscious or not, capitalize on
consumers' cognitive biases for own economic gain). But see James A. Henderson & Jeffrey J.
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Although their articles are in the service of an argument for enterprise
liability, 31 7 they also yield insights for the First Amendment's assumptions about
consumers' reception of commercial speech.
I will not rehearse here the substantial literature on cognitive illusions
surveyed in Section II, and from which Hanson and Kysar draw a substantial
part of their argument, though it is worth noting that their own survey identifies
still further aspects of behavioral research that may suggest problems for the
model of rational decision-making. 318 The upshot of this discussion, however, is
that, once the judgment-distorting effects of common behavioral traits are
acknowledged, "it becomes inevitable that manufacturers will exploit these ...
effects in a way that maximizes manufacturer profits." 319 A key insight of
behavioral analysis for the consumer market, they therefore suggest, is that
"individuals are vulnerable to manipulation by those in a position to influence
'320
the decisionmaking context.
Thus, scholars who argue against evidence of consumer underestimation of
risks by objecting that behavioral studies manipulated preferences through the
framing effect fail to see that "manufacturers can take advantage of such
manipulability. '321 For example, manufacturers may emphasize the ways in
which negative outcomes from the use of potentially hazardous products are
avoidable, even though a substantial number of accidents may be inevitable,
taking advantage of individuals' optimistic bias. 322 And the availability bias,
which played such an important role in analyzing the clear and present danger
test, plays a part here too: manufacturers may "maximiz[e] the frequency and
intensity of advertisements," for example. 32 3 In sum, "[m]anufacturers will
respond to market incentives by manipulating consumer perceptions in whatever
manner maximizes profits.

'324

Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 218 (2000) (criticizing Hanson and Kysar based on their failure to
qualitatively assess problems of market manipulation, to identify current legal mechanisms available
to protect consumers from manipulation, and to recognize that while some cognitive processes cause
consumers to underestimate risk. other processes lead consumers to overestimate their risk from
particular products).
317. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, Response, supra note 316, at 266-83 (outlining argument for
enterprise liability).
318. See generally Hanson & Kysar, Problem, supra note 316, at 643-93 (questioning basic
principle of utility theory and suggesting other influences affecting individual choice).
319. Id. at 724.
320. Hanson & Kysar, Evidence. supra note 316, at 1426.
321. Hanson & Kysar, Problem, supra note 316 at 725 (criticizing W. Kip VISCUSL FATAL
TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992)).
322. Id. at 729-31.
323. Id. at 731 Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions,41 JURIMETRICS J. 337,
343 (2001); see also Sarah C. Haan, Note, The "PersuasionRoute" of the Law: Advertising and Legal

Persuasion,100 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1300 (2000) (highlighting persuasive effects humor plays in
advertising); Note, Harnessing Madison Avenue: Advertising and Products Liability Theory, 107

HARV. L. REV. 895, 901 (1994) (summarizing dual purpose of advertising as serving to effectuate
persuasive communication and serving to inform customers of product safety).
324. Hanson and Kysar, Problem,supra note 316, at 743. See generally Note, The Elephant in the
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Hanson and Kysar provide significant evidence suggesting that their thesis
is in fact borne out by research into manufacturers' conduct. 325 Product
manufacturers fuel an annual market of $8 billion a year for the study of
consumer behavior, 326 drawing on a wide range of sophisticated psychological
research, 327 including the behavioral analysis research that is at the heart of this
Article. 328 For example, food product manufacturers take advantage of framing
effects by labeling their product as 75 percent fat-free rather than 25 percent fat,
a description of precisely the same product that nonetheless increases food
sales. 329 Drug manufacturers pitch their products with general reassurances that
products are safe, creating positive affective responses that downplay the
330
vigilance individual consumers might want to pay to drug advertisements.
Notwithstanding the informational justification for commercial speech, drug
promotion material advertised to physicians rarely actually contains content of
educational value. 331
Other advertisements are pitched specifically to
consumers' fears, and thus capitalize on the risk-analysis problems discussed
332
above.
The nature of some products provides additional reasons to think
consumers will not be capable of perfectly rational decision-making. Visceral
reactions caused by such factors as drug addiction will "cause people to behave
contrary to their own long-term self-interest, often with full awareness that they
are doing SO." ' 333 It is hardly surprising that marketers of products such as
cigarettes have long been successful at using a host of preference-manipulation
techniques. 334 A simple example of the framing effect's use in cigarette
marketing is the marketing of so-called "light" cigarettes. 335 The marketing of
Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counteradvertising in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116

Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (2003) (examining government's role in regulating nutrition in light of private
sector advertising and behavioral eating suggestion).
325. Hanson and Kysar, Evidence, supra note 316, at 1439-62.
326. Id. at 1429.
327. See id. at 1435-36 (noting some consumer behavior research derives from operant
conditioning, cognitive learning theory, cultural anthropology, and socialization theory).
328. See id. at 1439 & n.77 (giving example of textbook on consumer behavior that contained
section on heuristics).
329. Id. at 1451.
330. Hanson & Kysar, Evidence, supra note 316, at 1456.
331. Id. at 1458.
332. See id. at 1463 (discussing marketing of firearms that emphasizes women's fears with respect

to "personal protection and home defense") (citation omitted).
333. Hanson & Kysar, Problem, supra note 316, at 683 (citing George Loewenstein, Out of
Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 J. ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 289

(1996)).
334. See, e.g., Daniel Romer & Patrick Jamieson, Advertising, Smoker Imagery, and the Diffusion
of Smoking Behavior (finding that dramatic decline in risk perception that characterizes later

adolescent period is result of widespread diffusion of favorable images of smoking and positive
feelings about the experience), in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, & POLICY 127, 127-28 (Paul Slovic

ed., 2001); John Slade, Marketing Policies (discussing tobacco product advertising and marketing
practices), in REGULATING TOBACCO 72. 72-95 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).

335. Hanson & Kysar. Evidence, supra note 316, at 1507.
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smoking also benefits from the availability heuristic, which teaches that people
will systematically underestimate the risk of products whose negative outcomes
336
are routine and rarely subject to vivid media coverage.
C. The Implicationsof Cognitive Biasesfor CommercialSpeech Jurisprudence
The research summarized above suggests not only that a panoply of
cognitive traits may distort consumer preferences and their ability to carefully
evaluate marketing information, but that manufacturers have devoted massive
resources to taking advantage of this very fact. This research has significant
implications for the governing justifications for a speech-permissive approach to
commercial speech.
Since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court's speechprotective approach to commercial speech has been founded on the theory that
consumers are capable of rational choices about product purchases. 337 Thus,
informed consumer choices require "the free flow of commercial
information. ' 338 As Hanson and Kysar note, however, "it is naive to presume
that consumers can rationally process all the information necessary to optimize
their purchases." 339 Manufacturers are well aware of the means that are most
effective in affecting people's ability to make meaningful "informed consumer
choices," and do their best to manipulate these choices through a host of
judgment-distorting, preference-framing techniques.
Furthermore, the very description of "commercial information" is dubious.
A great deal of commercial speech is not designed to convey information, but to
evoke affective responses. "Lifestyle" advertising sends a message of sorts, by
signaling that people who want to fit a particular image-young, hip, virile,
affluent, and so forth-should use a particular product, but that message is more
emotional than informational. 340 Indeed, marketing insights of which advertisers
are well aware suggest a trend away from informational advertising. Advertisers
"believe that the ease with which an advertisement can be mentally processed is
key to its persuasiveness," and thus that "an advertisement should minimize
' 341
information about product attributes."
One response to the distorting effects of commercial speech is that counterinformation will serve to negate those effects; hence Justice Blackmun's view
that "people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them." 342 That view, too, is of questionable

336. Id. at 1514.
337. See Haan, supra note 323, at 1284 (noting that "the quarter century since Virginia Pharmacy
made the rational consumer theory part of First Amendment doctrine").
338. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 763-65.
339. Hanson & Kysar, Evidence, supra note 316, at 1454.
340. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 774-75 (Burger, J. concurring) (discussing how
advertising may prey upon a public susceptible to alluring appeals and misleading promises).
341. Haan. supra note 323, at 1297.
342. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy.425 U.S. at 770.
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accuracy in the arena of commercial speech. First of all, manufacturers may
actually coordinate their efforts, and thus reduce any likelihood that
counterspeech from competitor B will balance the distorting effects of
manufacturer A's marketing. 343 Furthermore, even absent coordination, there
are strong disincentives for manufacturers to advertise products' safety, since
that approach tends to backfire by evoking the potential of the product to cause.
harm. Thus, safety-oriented advertising may improve a manufacturer's brand as
34 4
against competitors, while reducing demand for the product as a whole.
Nor is it a sufficient response to argue that full disclosure of potential
product risks will cure consumers of irrational decision-making. As Jeremy
Fraiberg and Michael Trebilcock note, "information failures are not always
' 345
easily remedied merely through the provision of additional information.
Both the volume of typical information disclosures, such as those provided with
drug advertisements, and their technical nature make it difficult for the
consumer either to absorb the information or to select and discriminate among
disclosures, increasing the likelihood they will be ignored altogether.
Information disclosure is thus a poor safeguard against cognitive bias in
346
consumer decision-making.
Finally, as noted above, debiasing strategies are often ineffective. Even in
the best circumstances, they may be either costly or ineffective or both. In other
circumstances, the variability of the environment or the lack of knowledge about
actual outcomes may make debiasing impossible. 347 Consequently, faith in the
powers of commercial counter-speech, including government and private efforts
to balance advertisers' speech with health and safety-oriented counter348
advertising campaigns, may be unavailing.
Thus, behavioral analysis raises serious concerns about the prevailing
343. See Hanson & Kysar, Response, supra note 316, at 363 (recounting examples of cases of
industry coordination to manipulate consumer preferences and downplay the concerns raised by risky
products).
344. See id. at 337-38 (discussing disincentives to advertising a product's safety).
345. Jeremy D. Fraiberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and Democratic
Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 MCGILL L.J. 835, 839 (1998).
346. See Baruch Fischhoff, Need to Know: Analytical and Psychological Criteria, 6 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2000) ("[Slaying everything may have little more practical value than
saying nothing. Unless the list [of disclosures] is fortuitously short, such a 'core dump' violates the
norms of communication by failing to focus on what the audience most needs to know and can process
in a limited time."); Fraiberg & Trebilcock. supra note 345, at 839 ("[Eiven assuming that perfect
information were made available to all consumers, the time. energy and skill required to process such
information entail additional costs."); Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 316, at 227 ("[Cjognitive
psychology suggests that manufacturers can remain immune from liability by placing warnings on
products while simultaneously undermining the effect of these warnings."); see also Caroline E.
Mayer, Why Won't We Read the Manual?; Stupid Question, Perhaps, but Manufacturers Have Heard
Stupider, WASH. POST, May 26, 2002, at H1 (noting conclusion of consumer experts that customers
often fail to read product manuals).
347. Hanson & Kysar. Problem, supra note 316, at 692.
348. See, e.g., Romer & Jamieson, supra note 334, at 154 (citing research that "anticigarette
advertising ha[s] not been successful in countering the favorable images of smoking cultivated by
cigarette advertising").
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speech-permissive

approach

to

commercial speech. 349 These concerns should not be overstated: particularly in
an increasingly media-savvy society, there are grounds to believe that
manufacturers' efforts will not always be successful. 350

Nevertheless, the

pervasiveness of advertisers' efforts to shape or create consumer preferences,
and their expertise in the manipulation of cognitive shortcomings to achieve
these goals, suggests there may be reasons to treat government decisions to
regulate this speech with far greater deference than is accorded when dealing
with other varieties of First Amendment activity.
These concerns were given an explicit airing by the Supreme Court in its
recent opinion in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center.351 This case
presented a challenge to FDA enforcement of a provision of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997,352 which exempted compounded
drugs from FDA approval requirements if the drug providers refrained from
advertising or promoting certain compounded drugs. 353 Writing for the Court,
Justice O'Connor scoffed at the notion that the government could restrict the
advertising on the basis of "an interest in prohibiting the sale of compounded
drugs to 'patients who may not clearly need them.' ' 354 Although the Court
concluded that this justification had not been advanced by the government and
so could not serve as a basis for upholding the constitutionality of the provision,
it argued that "a fear that advertising compounded drugs would put people who
do not need such drugs at risk by causing them to convince their doctors to
prescribe the drugs anyway... would fail to justify the restrictions. ' 355 Quoting
Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court rejected the proposition that "the
Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful
commercial information in order to prevent members of the public from making
349. Indeed, some lower court decisions have demonstrated a decidedly different approach to
issues of commercial or market-oriented speech than that taken by the Supreme Court. See Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 (D. Mass.) (noting that tobacco advertising not only
influences consumers' brand preferences but also plays role in amount of smoking), affd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom., Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000), affid in part, rev'd in part
sub nom., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001): In re Number Nine Visual Tech. Corp.
Secs. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1. 20 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[I]t is hardly surprising that markets sometimes fail
to exhibit perfectly wealth-maximizing behavior, given the plethora of evidence from cognitive
psychologists and decision theorists suggesting that humans frequently behave in nonrational ways,
and that these 'cognitive biases' are largely incapable of being unlearned."); Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc.,
734 A.2d 1245. 1247 (N.J. 1999) (stating that when "mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to
influence a patient's choice of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes direct claims to
consumers for the efficacy of its product should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to provide
proper warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product").
350. See, e.g., Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 316, at 230 (noting "several good reasons to
suppose that manipulating consumer risk perceptions is extremely difficult. despite the influence
cognitive biases have on these estimates").
351. 535 U.S.357 (2002).
352. 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2000).
353. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360.
354. Id. at 373 (quoting id. at 379 (Breyer, J.,dissenting)).
355. Id. at 358.
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' 356
bad decisions with the information."
If this section accurately describes the real-world context in which
advertising for consumer goods operates, however, the Court was far too
dismissive of such a justification for regulation of commercial speech. As Justice
Breyer argued in dissent, "There is considerable evidence that consumer
oriented advertising will create strong consumer-driven demand for a particular
drug." 357 And advertisers' efforts to boost this demand, which run to
expenditures of over $1.3 billion annually, 358 may lead to a commensurate
increase in prescriptions, even of unnecessary drugs. 359 "[T]hose individual risks
added together can significantly affect the public health. At least, the FDA and
' 36
Congress could reasonably reach that conclusion. " 0
Thus, there are significant reasons to conclude that the Court's speechprotective approach to commercial speech is flawed, given the empirical and
psychological research showing the preference-altering effects of that speech.
There may be other justifications for this approach. For example, it may be too
difficult to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech, or
between different kinds of commercial speech that raise different levels of
concern about preference-distorting effects. 36t Additionally, one may mount a
normative challenge to any approach, however empirically justified, that permits
government to actively shape consumer preferences. 362 Certainly I find the
possibility of an increased skepticism about commercial speech and its effects
contrary to my own preferences and intuitions, and worry about its spillover
effects to other areas of First Amendment doctrine, such as the regulation of
hate speech and pornography. 363 But the standard justification for permitting
widely unregulated commercial speech-the assumption that consumers act
rationally-is wanting.
One solution to this problem (if it has been properly identified as such) is to
put teeth into the "misleading speech" prong of commercial speech doctrine, and
apply that test's deprivation of full constitutional protection for misleading
speech with more vigor than the courts have displayed thus far. That solution
raises concerns of its own, since it leaves a highly subjective justification for

356. Id. at 359 (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770).
357. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
358. Id.

359. Id.
360. Id. at 384.
361. See, e.g., Post, supra note 287, at 5-7 (discussing definitional problems in area of commercial
speech, and distinguishing between different kinds of commercial communications).
362. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins of the

Commercial Speech Doctrine, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 91, 93 (2002) (asking, "To what extent should the
government be able to restrict truthful advertising in order to manipulate behavior, or does our right
to be left alone limit such power?").
363. See Horwitz, supra note 21, at 452 (arguing against regulation of both); see also Redish,
supra note 280. at 44 ("[Tlhe deliberation rationale is simultaneously over- and under-inclusive as an
explanation for a rigid dichotomy between commercial and non-commercial speech.").
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speech regulation in the hands of public officials. 364 But leaving the ghost of a
"misleading speech" exception in place is not an answer either, but an evasion.
The courts have been reluctant to probe the limits of the "false and misleading
speech" exception, particularly the possibility of regulating misleading but
otherwise true commercial speech. 365 But it is precisely this variety of speechmisleading commercial speech, not false advertising-that should raise the
greatest concerns for prospective regulators. As commercial speech has become
less a vehicle for the direct transmission of information, and more a vehicle for
the transmission of images, symbols, and the sending of signals about the
"lifestyle" to which a product is supposed to correspond, more commercial
speech has become broadly "misleading" even as it becomes more difficult to
judge the truth or falsity of that speech. 366 If the regulation of commercial
speech is to serve the function of guarding against the significant effects that
advertising can have on consumers, then a bolder hand should be taken against
misleading speech, and a broader understanding of that term should be
encouraged.
At present, the trend is decidedly away from a vigorous governmental or
judicial enforcement of regulations barring false or misleading speech. 367 In
response to cases such as Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, for
example, the Food and Drug Administration recently issued a notice and request
for comments asking whether "its regulations, guidances, policies, and practices
continue to comply with the governing First Amendment case law." 368 Even this
foreshadowing of future government reticence to pursue regulation of false and
misleading speech, however, leaves room for hope that future regulatory
approaches to government restrictions on false and misleading commercial
speech might learn from behavioral analysis scholarship: The comment also asks
such questions as whether the FDA could "sustain a position that certain
promotional speech about drugs is inherently misleading," whether there is a
basis for distinguishing between speech aimed at consumers and at "learned

364. See, e.g., Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1219 (1983). Shiffrin observed,

Misleading speech is a half-breed, true in form and even in effect for many, but false in the
impressions it creates for others. All language misleads some people to some extent. How
many are too many and how much is too much are questions of policy and degree. The
distinction between the true and the misleading is normative.
Id.

365. See Piety, supra note 294, at 391 ("[T]he limits of the exception for regulation of advertising
that is misleading have not been tested nor pushed much thus far.").
366. See id. (discussing difficulty of testing advertising for its "truth").
367. But see Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (Cal. 2002) (rejecting Nike's argument that it
was insulated by First Amendment from liability for allegedly false and misleading statements made in
the course of defending its labor practices). Suffice it to say that my arguments here do not support
this ill-considered ruling, particularly given that the public statements made by Nike in this case hardly
fell within the categories of commercial speech that I argue above are most likely to give rise to
cognitive illusions.
368. See, e.g., Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942, 34,942 (May
16, 2002).
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intermediaries," whether the FDA's position is "consistent with empirical
research on the effects of [drug-related] advertisements, and whether there is
"any evidence as to which types of warnings consumers follow or disregard. '369
If these questions are more than a fig-leaf for an eventual clawback from current
regulatory approaches, they ought to be given a serious airing.
A behavioral analysis of commercial speech also raises interesting issues
about the other theme touched on in this Article: the question of institutional
choice-who should be assigned the responsibility for assessing the risk of harm
from speech. Commercial speech suggests a different institutional assignment
outcome than that suggested by illegal advocacy. Judges, juries, and legislators
all received information about the terrorist attacks on September 11, the Red
Scare, and the Cold War in much the same way, and all suffered from the same
biases. Assigning judges with primary responsibility for the risk analysis implicit
in the clear and present danger test was a sensible second-best outcome, given
the likelihood that judges can at least apply formalist tests in a more dependable
manner than juries.
But the judgment-distorting effects of commercial speech are not exogenous
to the context in which they are presented. The preference-distorting effects of
commercial speech depend on its frequency and pervasiveness, its elicitation of
affective responses such as craving and addiction, and its targeting to susceptible
consumers in niche markets. None of those aspects are present in the clinical
context of regulatory consideration of the same speech. 370 Thus, leaving aside

potential public choice concerns or questions concerning regulators' own
cognitive shortcomings, 371 it may be entirely appropriate to leave the issue to
legislators and regulators. 372

Behavioral analysis may thus lead to divergent

373
institutional assignments in different First Amendment contexts.

369. Id. at 34,943-44.
370. See Sunstein, supra note 29, at 146 ("One of the chief advantages of bureaucracy, at least in
principle, is that it can ensure that judgments will be based on facts rather than intuitions, in such a
way as to reduce the problems introduced by biases and heuristics.").
371. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi and Adam J. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
University of Michigan, John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 03-002,
March 20,2003, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm
(discussing potential behavioral shortcomings of Securities and Exchange Commission).
372. See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J..dissenting) ("[A]n overly rigid 'commercial
speech' doctrine will transform what ought to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the best way
to protect the health and safety of the American public into a constitutional decision prohibiting the
legislature from enacting necessary protections."). Indeed, the same argument has been made on
explicitly political grounds. For example, Shiffrin argues,
Although no one supposes the FTC is infallible, we have significantly less doubt about
government's capacity to define truth when it moves against a deceptive advertiser who
makes an allegedly false statement about its own or another's product, than we do when the
government moves against a source that has no profit motive in the sale of a product.
Shiffrin, supra note 364, at 1265.
373.
demands
contexts,
between

See Thompson, 535 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J.,dissenting) ("In my view, the Constitution
a more lenient application, an application that reflects the need for distinctions among
forms of regulation, and forms of speech, and which, in particular, clearly distinguishes
'commercial speech' and other forms of speech demanding stricter constitutional
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V. OBJECTIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This Article has presented an admittedly tentative account of First
Amendment law as seen through the lens of behavioral analysis. It suggests that
there is something lacking in the standard model of individual actors as capable
of rational thought and able to engage in risk analysis and other decision-making
activities in ways that respond to and suit their own best interests. That model is
pervasive throughout a great deal of law and legal scholarship, and it is present
too in First Amendment doctrine. But it is a flawed and incomplete model, one
that does not properly account for the real world of decision making, in which
individuals are subject to a wide array of cognitive practices and tics that may
distort their judgment and lead to faulty decisions.
Under this model, we must ask two questions. First, how well do the tests
that have developed in First Amendment doctrine account for and guard against
these predictable cognitive illusions?
Second, in any given area, which
institutional actor should be assigned the ultimate decision-making role? As this
Article suggests, the answers to these questions sometimes reinforce, and
sometimes counsel against, the jurisprudence as it stands; and they do not always
recommend the assignment of the decision-making role to the same institutional
actor.
Thus, while the evolution of the clear and present danger test can be seen as
a story about the slow erection of an effective, if second-best, safeguard against
the likelihood that the availability heuristic and other traits will distort risk
analysis, the law of commercial speech has evolved away from an accurate model
of the individual's capacity to sort through the factual claims, emotional appeals,
and other snares of commercial speech, and toward an inaccurate picture of the
"rational" consumer. And while assigning the decision-making role to judges,
rather than assigning that role primarily to jurors or legislators, may be a sensible
approach to the clear and present danger test, it is not necessarily the best
approach in commercial speech, where there are fewer concerns about the
judgment-distorting effects of commercial speech when it is viewed clinically by
administrative agencies and legislators.
That behavioral analysis suggests a particularistic, context-rich approach to
First Amendment doctrine does not present a sacrifice of certainty; First
Amendment doctrine is already a hodgepodge of tests and approaches.
Behavioral analysis may bring-to use a by-now fraught term-greater
rationality to First Amendment law.
What potential objections might be posed to such an approach? One such
set of objections is the general criticisms levied against behavioral analysis, and
particularly its application to the law. 37 4 For example, some critics have asked
protection.").
374. They are canvassed, and a response is offered, in Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and
Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000), on
which this paragraph draws heavily. See also Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus:
Cautionary Notes on the New BehavioralLaw and Economics Movement, 34 L. & SOC'Y REV. 973, 985
(2000) (arguing that legal scholars cannot simply use behavioral science in place of standard
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whether behavioral analysis is generally applicable outside the laboratory
environment in which most such studies are carried OUt. 3 75 That concern can be
answered with some certainty: attempts to apply behavioral analysis to various
376
fields, including law, have produced strong confirmatory data.
Critics have also suggested that, because behavioral analysis has revealed
such a wide range of heuristics and biases, sometimes conflicting ones, without a
clear set of guidelines for their application, it is likely to lead only to "conflicting
signals" and indeterminate predictions. 377 That criticism is not entirely fair.
First, behavioral analysis is complex because human decisions are complex. As
long as these phenomena are present, legal scholars must pay attention to them:
"ignoring complexity leads only to overly simplistic analysis. '378 Second, just as
it has always been too simplistic to argue in the field of statutory interpretation
that the existence of opposing interpretive canons renders their use entirely
inconsistent and unpredictable, 379 so this criticism of the profusion of biases and

microeconomics). For a recent, sustained criticism of behavioral analysis of law, see Gregory Mitchell,
Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of
Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Seriously].
Although Mitchell raises a number of serious criticisms of behavioral analysis of law, he also
emphasizes that his "criticisms ... should not be understood as a rejection of the psychological analysis
of law. This article arises from a strong belief in the utility of psychological and other empirical
research for legal analysis .... IId. at 1937. Rather, his criticisms are directed at "qualify[ing] legal
decision theory rather than reject[ing] it and... point[ing] out areas in need of further investigation
and consideration." Id. at 1937-38; see also Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect
Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO.
L.J. 67, passim (2002) (arguing that review of evidence on situational and empirical variability in
rational behavior reveals that behavioral law and economics' assumption of uniformly imperfect
rationality is no more plausible than law and economics' assumption of uniformly perfect rationality).
375. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 258, at 632 (stating that many biases and
heuristics remain untested in real-world government settings); Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously, supra note 374, at 1975 (noting that "psychological realism" of this research must still be
assessed to determine whether processes operative in these tasks are likely to be operative on other
experimental and real world tasks): Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490 (2002) ("Psychological papers
for the most part reflect outcomes of controlled studies in laboratory settings, and there is no way of
knowing how these results will translate into the real world of agency decisionmaking.").
376. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 258, at 743 (comparing judge and jury punitive damage
awards to experimental data).
377. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 128, at 301 (discussing normative puzzle); Robert A. Hillman,
The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000) (concluding that behavioral decision theory is more helpful in illustrating
limitations of narrow conception of human behavior in legal analysis than at creating positive or
normative theory of law). Eskridge and Ferejohn describe how "demonstrated cognitive biases have
grown like weeds in a vacant lot. As documented biases have multiplied, it has become harder to
reach conclusions from them. In any given institutional setting, there will be several potentially
applicable-and potentially cross-cutting--biases." Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 258, at 633.
378. Rachlinski, supra note 374, at 748.
379. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). For discussion
with reference to the voluminous literature, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 912-17 (3d ed.
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heuristics is too shallow. As with the interpretive canons, the application of
biases and heuristics "must depend upon context. '380 Different biases "can be
classified into typologies of cognitive errors and social influences,"' 381 and are
likely to apply in different situations; thus, they should serve not as trumps, but
as tools whose applicability and usefulness will vary according to circumstances.
In any event, behavioral analysis is in its infancy, and is already well under way
toward developing an overarching theory of human decision-making, guided by a
382
few central principles.
Another set of criticisms argues that, even if behavioral analysis is accurate,
it may not be able to provide much insight or accuracy when applied to the law,
whether descriptively or prescriptively. It is certainly fair to caution that
behaviorally based solutions to legal problems may carry their own set of
problems. 383 And in some cases, as this Article's treatment of the clear and
present danger test suggests, behavioral analysis may offer no more than a new
basis for justifying existing rules; the law may already have evolved in a way that
is sensitive to behavioral concerns. 384 But this criticism is a far cry from a
blanket refutation of behavioral analysis's value to law. Any approach that
improves our understanding of actual decision-making processes should have
some payoff for our understanding of the legal environment, even if it is a
385
tentative and incomplete one.
Finally, assuming that behavioral analysis has some merit, and that it has
useful applications to the law, what of the topic of this Article? What benefits
can be yielded by bringing a behavioral approach to the First Amendment? An
important criticism that has been leveled against behavioral analysis of law
generally, 386 and that could be employed against the thesis that behavioral
analysis has something to offer First Amendment jurisprudence in particular, is
that behavioral analysis fails to provide a basis for any normative conclusions
2001).
380. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 370

(2000).
381. Seidenfeld, supra note 375, at 495.
382. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 258, at 750-52.

383. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1747, 1756-57 (1998) (noting that in some circumstances, bench trials or rulemaking by
administrative agencies may be preferable to entrusting decisions to juries, but noting that "public law
solutions have their own problems," including the array of standard public choice problems that may
lead to suboptimal decisions by agencies and legislators).
384. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 374, at 754 (stating that because decision makers develop
procedures to reduce unwanted consequences of their members' cognitive limitations, it is likely that
legal system has already incorporated cognitive illusions).
385. See Farber, supra note 128, at 303 ("[I]t may be more fruitful in the long run ... to define
the project [of behavioral analysis of law] as deepening the understanding of legal problems through
using the models and methods of the social sciences.").
386. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1729, 1734 (1998) (arguing that insights from behavioral law have not been operationalized into
effective forms of proposed regulation); Samuel Issacharoff, The Difficult Path From Observation to
Prescription, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (2002) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Difficult Path] (concluding that
empiricism itself does not generate normative conclusions).
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about legal rules. Behavioral analysis provides a deeper empirical understanding
of human reasoning and decision making and illuminates the ways in which
cognitive shortcomings leave us short of achieving our goals, but it provides no
38 7
independent basis for determining what those goals ought to be.
This criticism certainly holds substantial truth for a behavioral analysis of
the First Amendment. In particular, behavioral analysis of the ways in which we
analyze the risk of harm cannot provide a definitive answer to three questions:
(1) What constitutes the "harm" against which speech regulations are directed?
(2) What sorts of harm are subject to permissible regulation of speech, at
whatever level of scrutiny? (3) What is the acceptable level of risk of harm, if
any, at which it is permissible to regulate speech?
Behavioral analysis may, in fact, have practical contributions to make with
respect to the first and third questions. For example, critical race theorists have
drawn on the psychological literature to develop a deeper understanding of the
harms that ensue from racist speech. 388 Understanding the psychological harms
wreaked by racist speech may thus contribute significantly to a normative theory
in favor of regulating that speech; conversely, a deeper understanding of the
cognitive shortcomings that afflict the prosecutors, judges and juries charged
with enforcing hate speech laws may provide ammunition against hate speech
regulation. Similarly, behavioral analysis can offer some guidance to the level of
risk of harm at which speech may be regulated, since it can suggest the ways in
which decision makers will overshoot the goal under the influence of cognitive
shortcomings such as the availability heuristic and its resultant biases.
Nonetheless, it is surely true that behavioral analysis ultimately helps us
understand our normative positions better, but cannot tell us what those
positions should be. If behavioral analysis tells us that hate speech causes harm,
it cannot tell us whether that harm should be addressed by the law. If it tells us
that decision makers are likely to perform a flawed probability analysis when
determining what risk of harm speech presents, it cannot tell us what level of risk
is acceptable-a strong risk of imminent harm, a weak risk of significant future
harm, or some other formula. In asking the crucial "what" and "why" questions
presented by the First Amendment-what is harmful speech, what speech may
be regulated, and why-behavioral analysis can never replace the normative
389
analysis that is the province of First Amendment theory.

387. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Difficult Path, supra note 386, at 45 ("It may be that the empirical
backbone of behavioral economics lends itself more fully to understanding where the law has arrived.
as opposed to the distinct terrain of where the law ought to be that is the claimed mantle of
theoretically-based approaches.").
388. See, e.g., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, chs. 2-4 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993) (considering victim's perspective on
racist speech and regulation of and tort action for racist speech).

389. See Frederick Schauer, Speech, Behaviour and the Interdependence of Fact and Value, in
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY, supra note 252, 43, 46 ("The claim
about the harmlessness of speech is a staple of public libertarian rhetoric ....
But the truth of this
claim is dependent on the conception of harm it employs."); id. at 55 (arguing that because we still
must decide what level of probability of harm resulting from speech justifies calling that speech the
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But behavioral analysis can nevertheless enrich our understanding of these
questions. Even if it cannot answer the ultimate normative questions that the
First Amendment poses, it can still sharpen our understanding of the "what"
questions-what constitutes harm, given our understanding of how people
actually react to psychological stimuli. And behavioral analysis can help us a
great deal with the question of how-given a normative conclusion about what
speech is properly subject to restriction, and a view on what level of risk of harm
will justify that restriction, how do we go about meeting these goals? As this
Article has shown, behavioral analysis has a great deal to say about our tendency
to overestimate the risk of harm when subjected to vivid examples, about how
we might structure tests to ensure a more accurate risk analysis, and about which
institution can best make the determination given the presence of cognitive
illusions. 390 In an important, practical sense, then, behavioral analysis can supply
an underpinning for at least one normative theory of constitutional law and its
emanation in such judicially crafted constitutional rules as the Brandenburgtest:
that constitutional law must pre-commit us to prophylactic measures that will
restrict our ability to engage in a short-sided and cognitively limited balancing of
391
constitutional freedoms against overestimated possibilities of harm.
In short, a reasonable response to the contention that behavioral analysis
leaves important normative questions unanswered is that this flaw is far from
fatal. Normative and empirical questions of law are always interdependent, even
when this connection goes unacknowledged.
Normative theories of law,
including free speech, often float on a raft of assumptions about human nature
and human decision making, without a grounding in a clearer empirical
understanding of human judgment and institutional analysis. As such, they will
either operate from erroneous suppositions or, even if correct in some sense, will
be unlikely to supply workable solutions. Normative theories of the First
Amendment can thus still learn from behavioral analysis, which may inform or
correct those underlying assumptions. Too many practical questions remain
unanswered to neglect the insights that behavioral analysis may supply.
This Article itself provides at least the beginnings of an answer to some of
those questions. Behavioral analysis can serve as an instructive guide to First
Amendment jurisprudence, laying bare the overconfidence in human rationality
that undergirds so much of the current doctrine and suggesting ways in which the

"cause" of the harm, "it is no longer so easy to separate the empirical question of the effect of speech
from the normative policy question of what, if anything, to do about such an effect if it does exist").
390. Cf HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 45, at 2-3. Hastie and Dawes state, as their goal,
We will attempt to detail pernicious modes of thought in order to provide advice about how
to improve choices. We will not suggest what your goals, preferences, or aspirations ought
to be when making these choices.... Our emphasis is on how, not what, but we do not wish
to derogate the importance of what is chosen or of values.
Id.
391. For general literature on precounitment and constitutionalism, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENS (1979), STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995), and JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF

CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).
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law has evolved usefully or poorly. Sometimes it is a recipe for change, or at
least for a cautious approach to current doctrine; at other times, it may bolster
our confidence in the merit of that doctrine.
Beyond this, let me suggest two potentially contradictory arguments in
First, an
favor of a behavioralist approach to the First Amendment.
instrumental, empirically-based account of the First Amendment robs us of our
complacent reliance on the old standby of general normative justifications for
First Amendment law-democracy, self-expression, and so forth. And justifiably
so. Richard Posner pertinently remarks:
Constitutional scholarship, including the scholarship of free speech, is
preoccupied on the one hand with Supreme Court decisions that are
notably lacking in an empirical dimension and on the other hand with
normative theories of free speech that have no empirical dimension
either. Vast as the literature is, very little of it is concerned with the
kind of empirical questions raised by this paper. This should be a
source of concern to anyone who believes that the instrumental
approach to free speech should have a role to play in the formation of
392
public policy.
Not everyone may agree that instrumental approaches to free speech are
justifiable. (I do.) But the train has already left the station on that issue.
Normative theorists of free speech rarely rest completely on that basis alone, but
quickly raise the usual host of explicitly policy-oriented concerns-slippery slope
arguments, arguments about whether particular doctrines actually serve
deliberative democracy, and an endless series of other arguments about what
works and what doesn't, what will result from particular tests and what won't.
As long as instrumental arguments about free speech are in play, then, it makes
sense to add a new player to the game. The law of free speech is, in the final
analysis, about making decisions under uncertainty. Behavioral analysis helps us
understand better how to go about making those decisions. Furthermore, free
speech is never an abstract; at some point it must be institutionalized and
operationalized. An entirely different set of questions therefore arise about
institutional choice; and normative theories of free speech do not always even
address those questions, let alone answer them. Behavioral analysis both
reminds us of the importance and complexity of institutional choice, and
provides some tools to help answer the question of who decides.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Article has suggested, there is no shortage of overarching theories
that purport to address free speech doctrine from on high. What we need now
are new facts, and new questions. We need a stronger factual understanding of
how individuals actually evaluate speech: when they are likely to overestimate
the risk of harm resulting from speech, and when they are likely to be unduly

392. Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 121, 151 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey C. Stone eds.,

2002).
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susceptible to cognitive failings that short-circuit their ability to rationally
evaluate advertisements and other commercial come-ons. And we need to stop
theorizing about First Amendment law under the settled institutional assumption
that the judiciary is always the body assigned primary responsibility for making
determinations about the risk of particular speech acts, and begin to ask whether
different institutions should be charged with this responsibility under different
circumstances.

Although it is not a panacea, behavioral analysis supplies the beginnings of
the new facts and new questions that First Amendment theory and doctrine
demand. As this Article has suggested, in some cases, such as that of illegal
advocacy doctrine, behavioral analysis confirms the direction the courts have
already taken, while offering a new positive analysis of why the courts acted the
way they did. In others, such as commercial speech doctrine, behavioral analysis
suggests that the courts have departed from what we know about real-world
decision-making, to the potentially serious detriment of consumers.
Finally, and more fancifully, the behavioral analysis set forth in this Article
offers one last virtue. Even if one rejects this instrumental approach to free
speech-or any instrumental approach to free speech-a behavioral analysis
approach to the First Amendment may still be worthwhile because it provides us
with a new metaphor. The law is, of course, rich with metaphor, and nowhere is
that more true than in First Amendment law. 39 3 These metaphors sometimes
enrich our understanding of an area of law, and sometimes arrest it. Legal
scholars have spent decades now arguing that the "marketplace of ideas"
metaphor fails to reflect the reality of the imperfect market for speech, or
adamantly defending the marketplace ideal. 394 At some point, we find that a
paradigm-setting metaphor has obscured our understanding of reality, or has
become played out, or has absurdly become more important than the idea it is
supposed to crystallize. Then we may hunger for new, arresting tropes to help
rearrange and unsettle our assumptions.
Thinking of the First Amendment as risk analysis is one such candidate.
Whatever ends it may lead to, it may at least awaken in us a thirst to think anew
395
about some old problems in free speech jurisprudence.

393. See generally David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment

Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857 (1986) (addressing role of metaphor in First Amendment and arguing that
a number of areas of First Amendment jurisprudence are full of creative misreadings of language of
earlier decisions). Cole argues, in particular, that Holmes' Abrams dissent and Brandeis' Whitney
concurrence engaged in "rhetorical misreading" of the clear and present danger test. Id. at 382; see
also Paul Horwitz, Law's Expression: The Promise and Perils of Judicial Opinion Writing in Canadian

Constitutional Law, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 101, 117-18 (2000) (discussing dangers and benefits of
metaphor in judicial language).
394. See Horwitz, supra note 393 at 118 (discussing dangers and benefits of metaphor in judicial
language).
395. Cf. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 77, at 615 (noting, in context of administrative law, that
cognitive psychology approach "offers a new set of metaphors for understanding the vulnerabilities,
and the capabilities, of public policymaking processes").

